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Introduction
My objective in this study is two-fold. First, I want to examine
the decision-making operations of the Supreme Court in the
period 1949-1969 by analyzing the reasons and votes in a sequence of related cases. Second, I want to present a critical review of the doctrinal pattern which has emerged in Canadian law
in the field in which I have chosen to assess the work of the court.
The family of legal problems which I have singled out involve
the various excuses to criminal conviction for prohibited conduct
-defences which flow from the lack of mens rea, responsibility,
or blameworthiness. Because these two interests may at times diverge, the article will frequently contain material which is extraneous to one or to the other. However, I feel that any such costs
are outweighed by the intellectual gains which result from an examination at the same time of a developing substantive area of
law and the workings of the institution which is chiefly responsible for this development.
In order to examine these different factors, we must have
some set of ideal standards, both as to how the courts should
operate and what kind of legal system should obtain here. Such a
standard will furnish both a criterion for selecting the issues to be
*Paul Weiler, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
This article is the first of a series of studies which I am writing on the
contribution of the Supreme Court of Canada to the development of
Canadian law since 1949. This continuing project has been financed by a
grant from the Canada Council made to my colleagues, Dean Gerald Le
Dain and Professor Sidney Peck, and myself. My two research assistants
in the summer of 1969, Paul Cavalluzzo and Paul Lannon, helped me in the
background research. My research assistants in the summer of 1970, Paul
Cavalluzzo and Joseph Weiler, prepared the behavioural tables which I
have used in the article. I would also like to express my gratitude to three
of my colleagues, Professors John Hogarth, Tony Hooper, and Stan Beck,
who read earlier versions of the article and made many helpful suggestions
for improvement.
' There are three helpful general treatments of facets of the Canadian
law of mens rea and the criminal law excuses: Ryan, The Necessity of Proof
of Wrongful Intent in Criminal Cases (1961-62), 4 Crim. L.Q. 63; Mewett,
The Shifting Basis of Criminal Law (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 468; Binavince, The Doctrine of Mens Rea in Canada, from The Fourth International Symposium on Comparative Law (1966), p. 82.
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discussed in this way and also a basis for assessing the court's
methods and results. Studies of the kind I am engaging in here
require that the investigator disclose clearly the values and ideals
which he brings to bear on the issue under discussion in order
to aid in the critical assessment of his own findings. I intend to go
somewhat beyond this demand because my concern is not simply
with understanding how the court has operated and why it has
selected any particular approach. Just as important is to point
the way towards and perhaps help in achieving better results. It
is probably impossible to separate completely these two objectives
in legal philosophy.
As will become apparent in the study, the prevailing theory
of judicial decision-making utilized by the Supreme Court is positivist. As is usually the case with a practical, action-oriented body,
such a general philosophy is more or less tacit and unconscious.
For this reason, it is probably even more effective in shaping the
assumptions upon which the court operates. By legal positivism
I mean a theory that individual cases should be decided by appeal
to legal rules which are found in conventional legal sources and
applied in accordance with their stated terms, without regard to
their fitness for the purpose for which they are used. The sources
can be statutory, judicial opinion, text-writer, and so on. In
dealing with them the court tries to assess the authoritativeness
of verbal statements which it finds and extracts. There is little or
no attempt to assess or rework these statements in the light of the
manifest purpose of the rule and the more basic values which the
system is supposed to implement.2
What is the alternative I suggest? 3 I assume that judges ought
to play a collaborative role with the legislature, in developing the
general policies to be implemented in the law. Because the judge
is at the point of application of general rules, he may be the best
reformer in certain kinds of situations. Yet, as a member of a
collective body, the judiciary, one charged with administering a
legal system, whose creation is the basic responsibility of a representative legislature, he cannot be completely "free-wheeling".
Hence, we need a general line of delineation between the legislative
and judicial responsibilities for improving the quality of our legal
order.
I would suggest that legislatures are best capable of major
reviews of the problems in a certain area, where the relevant,
available expert knowledge is explored, a systematic programme
2 This is what judges who are conventionally termed "positivist" customarily do. I would not at all suggest that such writers as Hart or Kelsen
advocate the position described in this paragraph.
3 This is a bare sketch of the ideas and literature canvassed in Weiler,
Two Models of Judicial Decision-makina (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406,
and Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-making (1970), 48 Can.
Bar Rev. 1.
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is implemented, compromises between important competing interests are registered, the popular acceptability of the basic scheme
is monitored, and sophisticated legal techniques for implementation are devised. Courts (or like bodies) are most competent at
rationally developing the implications of a scheme of social policy
already adopted for society (in our day, almost always by the
legislature). Within this framework of legislated values, a court
can protect the claims of fairness and equality by elaborating in a
coherent way the demands of these values for concrete situations
to which they are applicable. The court deals with problems individually, at retail as it were, with each competing interest having
no more favourable position than the relevant principles deem
proper. The results of impersonal unravelling of the established
policies become available to individual litigants when they really
need them, after they have already been hurt.
It is obvious that the lines of judicial restraint suggested are
not capable of precise, objective, and easily applicable statements.
However, I believe there is a sufficient core of content that its
honest acceptance by the courts would make a real difference in
the scope of judicial action. And full occupation of their proper
area of activity would have real benefits to society, both in the
quality of judge-made law and the saving of legislative energy for
more appropriate objects.
Hence, while I agree with the positivist claim that the flow
of judicial decisions must be channelled within certain established,
impersonal, and relatively fixed points of reference, I would argue
that the source of stability within the legal order flows from certain institutionally-accepted principles. Principles are general statements of social purposes and standards which do not have specific
application to individual cases, demanding one result rather than
another. Instead they operate in conjunction with other principles
to warrant the aptness of a new legal rule which is then applied
to the facts to justify a concrete decision.
Such principles have the added dimension of weight, something that follows from the fact that they do not logically require
certain results. Principles do not contradict each other and become overruled. Instead, they have greater or lesser significance
or importance to the relevant audience, and gradually grow in effectiveness or fade from view. They acquire legal existence and
weight when they become accepted as proper materials for legal
argumentation. This occurs when the direction and accumulation
of specific legal rules (statutory, judicial, or administrative) in a
certain area of law suggests such a principle as the rationale for
its existence and development, in the judgment of those who participate in the legal process.
Thus, not all policy statements can be characterized as legal
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principles, as institutionally accepted grounds for judicial reasoning which may justify the overruling, limitation, or extension of
specific rules which conflict with the rational implications of such
a principle. Nor do they become legal by specific enactment, at
one point of time, by an authorized body or procedure. They
make their appearance over a period of time, as lawyers, judges,
and scholars begin to appreciate the impact of a course of specific
decisions or new rules. Their period of gestation is always characterized by uncertainty as to whether they will attain successfully
the status of a legitimate tool in the judicial armoury.
Legal principles are particularly important in this view of the
judicial process because they are explicitly concerned with values,
with the purpose for which particular rules were enacted. Hence,
they are means by which judges advert to the significance and
desirability of the rules they propose to use, before applying them.
Yet they maintain stability and responsibility within the system
by furnishing a relatively objective and accepted standard for
reasoning about the rules which are to be used.
What about the use of principle in this particular problem
area of the law? Two facts are significant. First, the criminal law
is largely statutory now. By convention and law criminal offences
must be created by the legislature. However, legislative activity
is almost invariably fragmentary and usually directed only to the
specific problem of the desirability of new criminal prohibitions,
perhaps with some attention to procedure. These enactments are
always dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, on a substratum
of specific rules relating to individual responsibility and the criminal defences. These specific rules-age, insanity, self-defence, and
so on-are sometimes contained in the Criminal Code; at other
times they are found only in common law decisions or authoritative texts.
Second, this is one area where the conventional theory recognizes a principle, the mens rea doctrine, as the authoritative basis
for all of these specific rules. The many legal indicia of this conclusion are confirmed by the statutory provisions about the defences in the Criminal Code.' Hence, this would appear to be a
classic instance where the court should fulfill its role as a creative
developer of the basic policies which support these defences, refashioning the established rules to conform to changing facts and
insights, and extending them in directions to which their internal
logic points. The legislature seems consciously to have delegated
4 S.C., 1953-54, cc. 51, 52 as am., s. 7(2): "Every rule and principle of
the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for
an act or a defence to a charee continues in force and apolies in resoect of
proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act of the Parliament
of Canada, except in so far as they are altered by or are i-consistent with
this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada." Italics mine.
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this task to an institution which appears, on almost any standard,
to be best qualified for it, if the court would accept it.
Yet this is not to suggest that a court may legitimately innovate just as it wishes in this area. Even if we are not overly concerned with the absolute restraints of judicial precedent,' the court
must respect the legislative will when the latter has spoken. To
some extent, statutory language usually enacted on the basis of a
nineteenth century perception of the mens rea problem, may have
frozen the process of development and artificially precluded the
judicial creation of a coherent and rational body of law in the
area. Hence the Supreme Court is continually faced here with a
delicate question in the theory of statutory interpretation-how
clear a statement it would require from a legislature before acquiescing in a departure from the basic legal principle which animates the whole area of law, both statutory and judge-made.
I.

Mens Rea and the Purposes
of CriminalPunishment.

The question then arises-what are the policies which are implemented by the principle that mens rea is necessary for criminal
liability? In order to understand what the court has done, as well
as what it should do, we must be aware of the alternatives that
are open. This requires knowledge of why mens rea should be an
element in criminal guilt, in order that we formulate a standard
for determining what the law ought to be, and thus might be, like.
This in turn demands an enquiry into the nature of and reasons
for criminal punishment.6
The purpose of criminal punishment is the achievement of the
object of the criminal law, which is the elimination or reduction of
certain conduct considered to be harmful, or otherwise undesirable.
The substantive criminal law indicates the patterns of conduct to
be prohibited. In turn, these rules are dependent on some conception of the society which we want to result from the patterns
of conduct proscribed. Hence, this fact that crime control is not
an absolute all-encompassing end in itself requires certain limitations on the way the process is carried on, implied from the demands of a free and just society which it is our object to create.
It is important that the standards created by the substantive
criminal law be enacted and stated in order that citizens be able
to follow them, but this is not sufficient. The law needs to influence these decisions of private actors towards adherence to its
I As to which see MacGuigan, Precedent and Policy in the Supreme
Court (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 627.
6I do not claim any significant innovation in this sketch of the philosophy of punishment and responsibility and have not documented in any
detail my indebtedness to the recent work of such writers as Hart, Parker,
Wechsler, Hall, Kadish, Wooten, and so on.
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rules. Convictions, and what we do to convicted offenders, are
the mechanisms for achieving this influence. Hence what we will
call criminal punishment has as its purpose the various instruments
which are designed to implement the substantive rules formulated
by the law.
Now, in cases involving the defence of mens rea, its use is
logically dependent on and preceded by a finding that the defendant
has engaged in the conduct which the criminal law prohibits. In
other words, the harm which the law is intended to prevent has,
in objective fact, occurred and can be connected in a causal way
with the defendant's action or omission. The question then is,
what are the reasons which justify the conclusion that the defendant not be convicted and subjected to criminal punishment?
These reasons can be grouped into two preliminary categories. The
first is that, since the point of conviction is the sanction, the reasons
which justify the latter would serve no such purpose in this case.
Secondly, since these sanctions and the criminal law they implement are not absolute ends in themselves, they may have to yield
to other countervailing policies and commitments to our society's
ideals which weigh heavier in the scales. Despite the fact that application of the sanctions would serve the purpose of the sanctions
in making the criminal law effective, they would be harmful to the
achievement of the kind of society which the criminal law is supposed to protect.
Hence the first arguments in favour of the defences are that
they exclude from the punishment system those whose conviction
and sentence would not serve its specific mechanisms. The latter
are usually said to include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
intimidation and rehabilitation. These may appropriately be divided
into two categories, the one relating to the individual defendant,
the other to citizens and the legal system generally. We may call
these categories the behavioural and the legal, the one concerned
with the criminal, the other with the crime.'
' The focus of the first approach-the behavioural-is on the individual
offender as a problem, as someone who may be dangerous in the future.
Hence at a minimum he may be incarcerated (or perhaps executed) so as
to negate any danger from him while he is thus incapacitated. If possible,
though, the correctional authorities should try to change his dangerous
character, either by intimidating him, making him feel the errors of his
ways and fearful of future punishment, or by rehabilitatinghim, changing
his internal psyche so that it no longer impels him towards criminal behaviour.
The focus of the second approach-the legal-is on the criminal law
as a system of rules, general standards which must be known and adhered
to by those to whom they apply, in order that the policies which led to
their adoption be achieved. Punishment deters by making the "economic"
gains of crime marginally undesirable in terms of the risked losses. This
narrow version of the theory may apply in some cases but it obviously
does not in others. However, punishment, by representing the community's
condemnation of certain conduct may reinforce and help define the inter-
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Assuming that these are the immediate goals of punishment,
how is the doctrine of mens rea justified in their light? In a narrow
utilitarian perspective, punishment is an evil-a pain-and thus
presumptively undesirable. Hence there must be countervailing
gains in order to overcome this presumption and thus support the
use of the sanction. Where we can isolate cases to which these
countervailing gains do not apply, we must make exceptions to
the incidence of punishment. For example, the fear of punishment
which acts as a deterrent and thus influences general adherence
to the criminal law is such a gain, but there are cases in which
such fear can have no meaning.
This is especially true of criminal conduct which occurs by
reason of accident or mistake because it does not make sense to
threaten punishment in order to require adherence to rules one
could not have complied with. The same is true of special justifications such as self-defence or necessity where we prefer conduct
which is prima facie criminal in such exceptional circumstances,
because of the greater gains to society. Even if this conduct is not
preferable, on balance, we may be able to understand in cases of
provocation or duress the inevitable failure of deterrence sufficiently that we not want to impose further needless pain on a
technical offender. On the other hand, it is argued that, though
punishment might not have any sense in individual cases, it does
help maintain the credibility of the system of general deterrence.
Every new exception that is created in an institutional setting of
fallible fact-finding furnishes the possibility of leakage of actual,
responsible offenders. Closing up the excuses for everybody, including the bona fide cases, does increase the deterrent effect
for would-be law breakers.
The same analysis can be made about the behavioural perspective. This assumes the judgment that an individual is dangerous and thus should be subjected to individualized official
intervention and treatment. It is argued that only on proof of
nalized standards of behaviour to which we adhere, more or less unthinkingly, and without any weighing of the marginal utility of legal and illegal
alternatives.
The legitimacy of retribution as an independent consideration in the
justification of criminal punishment is hotly disputed at present. Though
the goal of exacting social vengeance from the criminal for the harm he
has caused is no longer viewed with much favour, there is substantial
recent interest in some subtler values which are connoted by this theory.
It has been suggested that criminal punishment is necessary to implement
the ideals of fairness and equality within a legal system by restoring the
equilibrium in benefits and burdens which has been disturbed by the criminal offences. Retributive justice requires that we punish only those who are
in breach of substantive standards of the criminal law, but that we punish
all of those who do disobey, and that such punishment be meted out in
some appropriate proportion to the relative seriousness of the offence. This
final basis of the criminal sanction is particularly relevant to the mens rea
issue.
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responsible decisions to break the law can we rely for the judgment
that one individual is distinctively more dangerous than another.
The mere objective fact of causing the harm prohibited by the
criminal law does not tell us anything reliable about a defendant
who was thrust into an environment where he acted out of ignorance to cause an accidental harm. Yet it is obvious that this
is not so in the case of certain irresponsible offenders such as the
insane, the epileptic, perhaps the accident-prone. In fact, the
logical thrust of the behavioural school is towards the development of prediction tables which would subject the delinquencyprone to compulsory treatment and attitude change. This leads
inevitably to the position that we should dispose not only of the
requirement that an individual engaged in criminal conduct responsibly, but also of the logically prior requirement that he engaged
in any specific criminal conduct at all.
Although, it is true, as I have argued, that this utilitarian
rationale for mens rea may not apply absolutely, -and to all cases,
it does establish a substantial prima facie case for the defence. It
requires demonstrated, not simply hypothetical, arguments to rebut it in the ways I have suggested are possible. Even if these
countervailing reasons are advanced on this level, further arguments may fill the breach. These stem from a subtler view of the
general influence of criminal standards. It is unlikely that the real
impact is based on the rational fear of pain. Deterrence is much
more ephemeral than the theory of the rational weighing of the
pleasures or gains from criminal conduct against the pains or costs
of the sanctions which are risked. Instead, the leverage of the
criminal law as regards the vast majority of the populace inheres
in their voluntary acceptance of its dictates as morally proper,
such that they do not think of the criminal alternative, or they
recoil emotionally from it even where they would not likely be
detected.
This analysis is probably true of the ordinary operation of the
system, although there are exceptions in the case of certain "conventional" crimes or certain marginal and alienated groups. If to
break the criminal law is to do something morally wrong, then
the essence of criminal punishment is the expression of the community's moral condemnation-its hatred, fear, and contempt of
the conduct engaged in by the offender-and not simply to impose
those unpleasant physical consequences or treatment as a result.
This conventional or symbolic device serves to dramatize and reinforce the community's moral condemnation and disavowal of
the offence and its stigmatization of the offender. To single out,
in a systematic way, blameless or irresponsible individuals as the
objects of this "morality play" is not only parasitic and unfair,
but may well be self-defeating. It results in a loss of the aura of
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moral acceptability and worthiness which it is the point of criminal
punishment to reinforce. It is important that society not lose sight
of the distinction between harmful response by society which carries this condemnatory aura and a perhaps equally harmful societal
response which is purely amoral in character.
Of course this whole argument is unacceptable to those who
would advocate the elimination of punishment, in the sense of
pain or hardship expressing moral blame. The behavioural view
is willing to risk the loss of any general influence of punishment
on other members of society who might choose to adhere voluntarily to criminal standards as a result. The individual offender,
whoever he is, is a sick, albeit dangerous individual, to be treated
if he is discovered, but not amenable to the individual influence
of example. Although pain or hardship may be a characteristic of
treatment, it is such only as an unavoidable concomitant of scientific, therapeutic measures for rehabilitation of individual cases.
Even to this argument, in the areas where it may be justified,
there is a third rationale for the doctrine of mens rea, the argument from legality and individual freedom.
What is distinctive about this last rationale is that it is not
utilitarian in the direct or subtler senses of the first two. It is not
concerned with the attainment of goals in the most effective and
least costly fashion. Rather it is designed to protect certain values
by imposing limitations on the means adopted by society in its
pursuit of goals through a system of criminal punishment. As such
it is comprised within the family of notions associated with justice
and fairness.
There are two different foci to this argument. In a negative
sense, the requirement of mens rea follows ineluctably from the
requirement of conduct. Legal rules must point to action, to a
person doing something, rather than to his status, character, and
so on, if they purport to be a real restraint on official discretion.
It is true that certain kinds of status may be sufficiently welldefined by their symptoms or indicia that they can be the basis
of the objective application of communicable legal rules (for
instance, perhaps, psychotics or drug addicts). This cannot be
true, certainly in our present state of knowledge, of a vague
generalized standard such as "dangerous" or "requiring treatment".
The latter type of standard would confer far too much discretion
on officials and so we want to limit their power of intervention to
cases where a person has done something.
Yet how can we define conduct except by incorporating some
reference to intent or other such mental element? Take the important crimes of murder or theft, each of which prohibits conduct causing a certain consequence (death or deprivation of
property respectively). I suggest that we cannot meaningfully
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isolate those involved in producing the result except by reference
to some standard of subjective responsibility for it. If this is not
explicit, then inevitably the concept of "cause" will change from
the bare but meaningful standard of "but for" to a more ambiguous criterion incorporating a tacit reference to "expectations".
The same is true of many crimes which prohibit doing things with
a specific intent (attempt, burglary, and so on), or without it (assault, rape, and so on). In order to implement a significant conduct limitation on the criminal process then, we must also have a
doctrinal requirement of mens rea. If we do not have the conduct
limitation we lose the restraints of legality on our official exercise
of this most serious power.
The second focus of this rationale is more positive. The law
makes the assumption that we are responsible choosing beings.
Even if this cannot be demonstrated metaphysically, it is hard
to see how, given our present psychological make-up, we can
avoid acting on the assumption that this is true. Certainly this assumption must be made about the bases for the action of our
officials, if not of the "objects" they purport to control. If we
assume further that there are no significant differences in this
respect, metaphysically or psychologically, between officialdom
and those subject to the criminal law, then respect for our freedom of choice requires a social structure, including a criminal
law, which supports and protects it.
The whole point of a criminal law which consists of rules,
and general norms, is that it both enables and demands that individuals "self-apply" them to their proposed conduct and decide
whether to obey or not. If we have no doctrinal requirement of
mens rea, then punishment will become arbitrary-inflicted because of unintended fortuitous consequences. Obedience will be
deprived of meaning and significance because apparently sufficient
attempts to comply will no longer determine whether or not a
person suffers the sanctions attached to non-compliance. The
result will be that the sanctions will lose much of their influence
and impact, or that citizens will be driven from areas of desirable
but borderline conduct.
Even if these are not the effects, we impose real costs on individuals by depriving them of the chance to order their lives as
much as possible on the basis of their own choice of conduct or
consequence. We deprive them of the power to choose to stay
out of the clutches of the criminal law. Even if we follow the
behaviouralists in their quest to remove all intended connotations
of pain or blame, penalty and punishment, from the criminal law,
we still impose a real cost on individuals who are put through it,
a real risk that the wrong "therapeutic" choice will be made. We
deprive them of the sense of security, then, which is associated
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with a social structure permitting us to choose and plan what our
futures will be. All of this is to no purpose, either, because treatment must obviously consider the mental state of the offender at
the post-conviction sentence and correctional stage. Only some of
the innocent people will be accident-prone while most will prove
to be ordinary, though unlucky. Yet we leave these judgments to
the discretion of our officials, rather than as a requirement of
viable objective standards. We make them near the end of the
process, rather than at the beginning, where the ordinary unlucky
person will get the benefit of exclusion from the "therapeutic experience".
Finally, the absence of a doctrine of responsibility in the
criminal process denies in this very important instrument the very
assumption of the society which, inter alia, the behavioural correctional authorities are trying to achieve with it. This assumption
is that the members of the society are persons, individuals having
human rights and concomitant obligations, whose inalienably equal
character can only be accounted for by their power of free choice.
Such principles as justice and equality stem from a recognition of
the demand that all individuals should be free to work out their
own destinies within restraints which are designed to protect the
same freedom of action of their fellows. It is incompatible with
this ideal that such a basic institution as the criminal law assume
that there is no point in enquiring whether or not these restraints
have been freely broken, before the decision to intervene crudely
and forcibly in his freedom of action is warranted.
These are the complex of ideas and attitudes which coalesce
in the principle that mens rea should be the basis of criminal
liability. Each reason can be attacked as vulnerable in certain
areas and, like all value arguments, none is certain and self-evident.
However, cumulatively, they make a strong presumptive case
which can and should be over-ridden only for good and adequate
reasons which are responsive to each of these arguments.
Moreover these arguments apply in several different fashions.
As we shall see, sometimes the court is required to decide whether
"fault" shall be a condition for criminal guilt or not. On other
occasions the question is simply the degree of fault that is necessary or, even more peripherally, how extensively certain doctrines
or statutory provisions affecting the scope of mens rea should be
interpreted. The point is that each of these strands of argument
relating to responsibility are relevant in any one of these situations
and that all of these problems are inextricably connected. A court
which is trying to comply with the demands of the principle of
mens rea must be sensitive to its demands in all the contexts in
which it arises, must see the relevant analogies between these different situations and must ensure that its decisions fit together in
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some coherent fashion.
II. Behavioural Analysis of Supreme Court
Decision-making.
The orientation of this study is, or so I hope, an integrated view
of the operations of the judicial process. The kinds of cases that
come to the highest appellate court in the land involve sufficient
importance, and sufficient ambiguity, that strongly-held attitudes
are likely to be reflected in the pattern of decision-making. Behavioural analysis of the flow of decisions is likely to isolate any
such attitudes and indicate their influence on the judicial choices
made. It will also help determine the inter-personal influences
within the court, the interest and impact each person has in the
decision-making process, at least so far as can be gained from
perusal of blocs, majorities and minorities, opinion-writing, concurrences, and so on.
However, I assume that courts are more than judicial voters,
and that the significant aspects of judicial behaviour are not confined to their votes. Between the vote and the general reasons
they give for the vote are the legal rules - the generalizations
and doctrines they decide to adopt and apply to the specific case.
Many different kinds of issues may coalesce in a particular case
and may result in a final voting decision one way or the other.
In assessing their behaviour, it is important to isolate the pattern
of decisions about a particular, defined family of rules or doctrines
and assess judicial attitudes to the doctrine. Such an assumption is
valid if for no other reason than that the real impact of the court
comes from the legal rules they establish. Only a small number
of cases reach the court for specific decision and the real impact
of the policies they establish comes from the application by others
of the general rules they formulate.
However, the creation of rules by courts is not simply the
exercise of a fiat, the enactment of specific authoritative language.
Judicial development of rules is the product of reasoned opinions
and this process of reasoning must be assumed to have some influence on the rules which result. Hence an integrated approach
requires a systematic sustained study of the kinds of reasons which
the court utilizes in this one segment of its work, this one doctrinal area. Our objective will be the characterization of the style
of reasoning employed by the court, whether "formal" and positivist or "grand" and purposive. As we shall see, the court's style
is overwhelmingly formal and legalistic. Although the whole trend
of its opinions is thus to disguise the fact of its choice among
alternatives left within the interstices of abstract doctrine, merely
to decide is to make a choice, as far as the court is concerned. As
we shall also see, the evidence is overwhelming that these choices
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are not made randomly between different policy outcomes, by the
different judges. Yet their confinement to the formalistic approach
seriously limits the clarity and impact of the policy they seek to
implement.
Hence I feel it is extremely useful to subject the Supreme
Court decisions in this area to systematic, quantitative investigation.
If patterns of behaviour do emerge, their analysis can be very
helpful in understanding and assessing the court's decision-making
process. The fact that such investigations may not be a sufficient
source of explanation is no reason for refusing to recognize their
necessary place in any fully-integrated theory of the court's operations. The versions which follow are very simple and very tentative
but, I believe, quite suggestive of fruitful inferences. From some
of my factual findings I draw no such inferences, and merely
report the results as part of an ongoing study in which they will
play a further role.
The first behavioural investigation to be reported concerns the
use of the cumulative scale to detect attitudinal bases for judicial
decisions. The theoretical and technical facets of the Guttman
scale are quite complicated and have been adequately analyzed
elsewhere.' In the final analysis, though, their significance is quite
simple. We start with a group of judges who are exposed to a
series of cases with very different factual, procedural, and legal
problems. When we see what the judges do with these situations,
we find not a random distribution of decisions, but a coherent
reproducible pattern, when they are considered from a particular
dimension. If statistical criteria excluding chance are met, it becomes legitimate (though perhaps not scientifically necessary)
to infer that the judges perceived these cases along this particular
dimension and voted in accordance with their attitude to it.9 This
may be true at least of those judges at either end of the spectrum
who consistently vote in favour of one position, notwithstanding
I See Peck, A Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram
Analysis (1967), 5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; The Supreme Court of Canada
1958-1966: A Search for Policy Through Scalogram Analysis (1967), 45
Can. Bar Rev. 666, esp., at pp. 713-722.
* The reason why scalogram analysis does not demonstrate the existence
and influence of judicial attitudes with scientific certainty is that it depends
to a substantial extent on a circular argument. In effect, the use of a scale
assumes that it is possible to infer judicial attitudes from the pattern of
their votes and that these attitudes can then be used to explain this very
voting pattern. The difficulty is that the judges may not have perceived
their votes as expressing, the values which the behaviouralist imputes to
their decision. What is lacking in most scaling up to now has been an independent test of the existence of judicial values, through interviews, questionnaires, content analysis of their opinions or non-judicial utterances, or
examination of their backgrounds. Once there is such independent evidence
of a judicial preference for the criminal defendant, for instance, it becomes
a much more plausible explanation of a consistent pattern of votes for the
defendant.
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the great variety of conventional legal contexts in which it is
raised.
Because my object in this article is a little different from most
behavioural investigations of the judicial process, I have not limited
myself to the conventional parameters of the Guttman scale. I
have created two scales of the twenty-three decisions relating to
mens rea in this area. One of the scales deals with votes for the
defendant or the Crown in the case; the second deals with opinions
in favour of, or against the value of mens rea. As will be seen,
although the cases all clearly raise this issue, not all judges ieach
a decision about it in the course of explaining their vote. I assume
that within a system of stare decisis, where rules become established by their statement in judicial opinions, the decision to express a favourable or unfavourable view of mens rea in a particular context (or the failure to speak to this issue at all) is at
least as significant for criminal defendants in our legal system as
the decision to vote for or against the defendant in the particular
case. I also assume that judges in our appellate court perceive the
authoritative significance of their decision about what they do or
do not say about the legal rule at issue and that these decisions are
equally indicative of their personal attitudes as are their votes.
In constructing the scales I have included all unanimous decisions, as well as the divided ones, although I have isolated the
latter on the scale. Though perhaps in conflict with scaling theory,
including unanimous decisions is helpful in understanding the
court's work as a whole, especially when we see differences in the
way certain cases line up on the criminal defendant and the mens
rea dimensions. Moreover, the theoretical assumptions which require exclusion of unanimous cases become somewhat strained
when applied to a court which sits in panels.
What are the conclusions which can be drawn from these
scales? If we compare the two, we can see several radical differences in the cases themselves. O'Grady," which was 7-2 for the
Crown vote scale, becomes 9-0 in favour of the mens rea position.
Binus," which was 5-0 for the Crown in votes, becomes 3-2 for
the mens rea position. King," which was 5-0 for the defendant
on the voting scale, becomes only 3-0 on the mens rea scale.
George," which was 4-1 for the Crown on the voting scale is 4-0
on the mens rea scale. Lemire," which was 4-3 for the Crown on
the voting scale, becomes 4-0 on the mens rea scale. This number
of instances together should raise questions about the desirability
of excluding apparently unanimous decisions from behavioural
analysis."
'0 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804.
n1 R. v. Binus, [19671 S C.R. 594.
"R. v. King. [19621 S.C.R. 746.
"R. v. George. [19601 SC R R71. "R. v. Lpmire. T19651 S C.R. 174.
"When we look at individual judges, though, the different scales do not
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The attitudinal break-down of the judges remains unchanged,
though. What are our findings? At one extreme end of the scale
is Cartwright J. He voted for the defendant in every case, unanimous and divided, except Binus. As was stated above regarding
this case, on the issue on which there was a divided opinion in
the court he voted for the defendant( or mens rea). Of the present
judges on the court, Hall and Spence JJ. appear close to Cartwright J. in attitude. Hall J. agreed with Cartwright J. in every
case in which they participated, and voted for the defendant on
both scales in every case except Wright," a unanimous decision
in which Cartwright J. did not participate. Spence J. voted with
Cartwright J. in every case in which they participated, Binus being
the only case in which he voted for the Crown on either scale. On
the court in the Fifties, Estey and Rand JJ. tended to agree with
Cartwright J., more often than not, but were not so consistent in
favour of the defendant. Locke J., a most interesting case, I will
leave for later.
At the other end of the scale, Fauteux J. voted for the Crown
on both scales in every divided decision. Unlike Cartwright J.,
though, he was ready to vote for the defendant in cases the court
perceived unanimously. Taschereau J. agreed with Fauteaux J. in
every case but two, and voted for the defendant in divided cases
only in these two. One of these, Laroche, " is explainable for
reasons suggested earlier. The other, Rees," a 6-1 decision for the
defendant, perhaps aptly distinguishes Fauteaux J.'s slightly more
extreme attitude from Taschereau J.'s. Judson J. also voted for the
defendant only once in divided cases, More" (a 5-2 decision),
and agreed with Taschereau J. and Fauteux J. in every other case
in which either of these latter participated.
Each of these findings about the extremes is substantiated not
only on the two mens rea scales but also on the general criminal
law scales constructed by Professor Peck.2 0The fact that the latter's
scales have quite a different selection of cases, based on a wider
area of criminal law for a shorter time period, makes this inderequire major adjustments, though some apparent anomalies are explained.
Cartwright J. voted for the Crown only in Binus, but, on investigation, the
major thrust of his opinion was the adoption of a very pro-defendant mens
rea rule, one which still convicted this defendant on the facts. Spence and
Ritchie JJ. also changed in the same way. Taschereau J.'s anomalous vote
for the accused in Lemire turns out to be based on a jurisdictional ground.
Judson J.'s vote for the defendant in King is apparently a result of the
Crown's failure to appeal on grounds which would have succeeded as far
as he was concerned. Locke J.'s seemingly unscalable pattern is somewhat
diluted, and perhaps explained, by his decision in King and George to
decide on neutral grounds.
" R. v. Wright, [19691 S.C.R. 335.
"'R. v. Laroche, [19641 S.C.R. 667.
" The Queen v. Rees, [19561 S.C.R. 640.
"More v. The Queen (1963), 3 C.C.C. 289 (S.C.C.).
2" Op. cit., footnote 8.
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pendent verification quite significant. The position as regards the
middle judges is somewhat different, though, which is perhaps
indicative of their less ideological viewpoint and less attitudinallybased voting.
Abbott J. is much more in the centre of this scale than in Professor Peck's criminal law scale. He voted for the Crown in 3-2
and 5-4 decisions for the Crown, and for the defendant in a 4-3
decision in favour of the defendant. On the mens rea vote scale
he voted for the Crown five times out of eight in divided decisions
and four times out of seven on the mens rea issue scale. Ritchie
and Martland JJ. are to the right of Abbott J. on these scales
while they were to the left on Professor Peck's scales. Of greater
interest as regards the latter two is their perfect concurrence with
each other, in unanimous decisions and divided ones, for the
Crown or for the defendant, and on both scales, even where they
do not decide on the mens rea issue. The relative position of the
two is also indicated by their perfect concurrence with Judson J.
on the mens rea vote scale.
Locke J., as we have said, is very interesting and unique. On
Professor Peck's general criminal law scale, he was to the right of
everyone except Fauteux, Taschereau and Judson JJ. On each
of my scales he is to the left of everyone except Cartwright J. Yet
his position there accounts for three of the six inconsistencies on
the vote scale and three of the five on the issue scale, all because
of votes for the Crown. He voted five times for the defendant
and five times for the Crown in divided decisions on the vote
scale. Most of the affirmative votes for the defendant which account for his very low break-point are very tenuous on closer
analysis (see O'Grady, King and George). In King and George
he did not decide about the mens rea issue at all, and he was
the only judge of whom this was true more than once. Yet his vote
for the defendant in Shymkowich" was the only dissenting vote
for the defendant, and only Cartwright J. showed this distinction
of voting alone for the defendant on the whole scale. In conventional terms, then, he must remain where he is on the scale. It is
probably correct to say, on the available evidence, that he does
not appear overly influenced by the criminal defendant or mens
rea attitude. Further evidence must be sought in other scales,
dealing for example with criminal procedure or the substantive
offences.
A third table furnishes a somewhat different type of information. The first patterns which emerge from this table concern
trends of unanimous and divided decisions on the court. If we
divide the court into two periods, one from 1951-1960, the
other from 1961-1969, there are twelve cases in the first period
"1R. v. Shymkowich, [1954] S.C.R. 606.
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and eleven in the second. In the first period there is only one
unanimous decision, the other eleven being divided. The unanimous
decision was for the defendant, as were three of the divided cases.
The other eight decisions, all divided, were for the Crown. From
1961-1969, there were eight unanimous decisions, five for the
defendant and three for the Crown. The three divided decisions
included one for the defendant and two for the Crown, giving a
total of six for the defendant and five for the Crown.
Hence, in the Fifties, there were far more divided decisions
and decisions for the Crown. In the Sixties, there was a sufficient
change in trend that a large majority of the decisions were unanimous and a small majority in favour of the defendant. Though
not apparent from this table, each such tendency is less pronounced
if we look at decisions on the issue scale. In the first period, there
were three unanimous and nine divided, a total of five for the
defendant and seven for the Crown. In the second period, there
were seven unanimous and four divided, six for the defendant
and five for the Crown.
The table furnishes a second kind of interesting information,
this time about individual patterns and blocs in opinion-writing.
Cartwright J. participated in eighteen out of twenty-three possible
cases and wrote fifteen opinions. He wrote eight of these for the
majority of which three were concurred in and seven dissenting
opinions of which three were concurred in (only Fauteux and
Estey JJ. also wrote dissenting opinions which were concurred in).
In the other three cases, Cartwright J. concurred in opinions with
Estey J. (dissenting), Rand and Ritchie JJ. In general, Cartwright J. appears to be somewhat alone in opinion-writing, with
no identifiable bloc which identifies with him, or in which he
joins, notwithstanding voting agreement with Estey and Rand JJ.
in the Fifties and Hall and Spence JJ. in the Sixties.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Fauteux J. participated in
twenty-one of twenty-three possible cases, and wrote ten opinions.
He wrote six majority opinions, of which five were concurred in,
and four dissents, of which three were concurred in. In the other
eleven cases, he concurred in eleven majority opinions, not one
of which was written by Taschereau J. In fact, Taschereau J., who
participated in nineteen out of twenty-three cases, and wrote five
opinions, three majority and two dissenting, never once attracted
a concurring vote of anyone to his opinions. He himself concurred
in one dissenting opinion, written by Fauteux J. and eight more
were also concurred in by Fauteux J. Hence, the high degree of
voting concurrence of Fauteux and Taschereau JJ. is also reflected
in opinion concurrence, but the latter demonstrates the dominant
character of Fauteux J. in this partnership.
Between these two extremes is the pivotal group led by Rit-
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chie J. The latter sat in all thirteen cases before the court during
his tenure and never once was in the minority. He wrote six
majority opinions and all six were concurred in by a majority of
the court. Fauteux J. concurred in Ritchie J.'s opinions three
times, more than he did with anyone else. Martland J. sat in
eleven out of fourteen cases, also never dissented, but wrote only
one opinion, which was concurred in by a majority including
Ritchie and Fauteux JJ. He concurred in six opinions of Ritchie J.
and in three other cases he concurred in opinions which also were
concurred in by Ritchie and Judson JJ., sat in ten out of fourteen
possible cases and wrote four opinions. One of the latter (Binus)
was in effect a minority decision about the legal problem. Although
he concurred in three Ritchie J.'s opinions, and Ritchie J. concurred in two of his, he is not a solid member of Ritchie J.'s
bloc. In two important cases, King and Binus, he did not agree
with the Ritchie opinions about basic legal questions."
Much of this information is not of great significance for the
small sample from which it is drawn. The important inferences
which can be drawn for immediate purposes will be drawn later.
The information relating to unanimity, opinion-writing, blocs,
and so on, is reported here, though, as the first of a series of investigations of the court's work. The information may assume
much greater significance later if the same patterns are reproduced
in other areas of the court's work.
The third table is concerned with another distinctive kind of
information. In an effort to assess the complexity and sophistication of the court's opinions, I used as the index the number of
legal authorities cited in each opinion. I counted only the authorities cited relating to the mens rea issue. The following are the
findings:
Again, much of this information is useful only if it is put in
the context of a larger picture of the Supreme Court's work. However, from this limited sample, several conclusions are quite interesting, perhaps the most significant of which are the relatively
few citations per case and the substantial decrease in recent years.
It is almost incredible to find that each case averages only about
six (6.3) citations, and each opinion only two (2.2). Because
" The other judges are all somewhat unique. Abbott J. sat in ten of
twenty cases and never once wrote an Qpinion. He dissented only once,
following Fauteux J., and joined in a great variety of majority opinions
from different judges. Rand J. appeared in eight of nine possible cases and
wrote seven times, six in the majority. In the Fifties, there was a much
greater tendency towards short separate opinions by all judges, and much
less evidence of blocs from such as Estey, Kerwin, or Kellock JJ. Locke J.,
who participated in twelve of thirteen possible cases, was as flexible here as
elsewhere. He wrote three majority opinions for the Crown and two for the
defendant. He wrote two dissenting opinions for the defendant. He concurred five times, twice in dissent, three times in the majority, twice for
the Crown and three times for the defendant. He concurred with Cartwright J. twice, one in dissent and one in the majority.
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the majority opinions average less than two citations, while the
dissenting opinions have about three, we can help explain the
substantial decrease in the Sixties. There were far more unanimous
opinions in the Sixties, each case averaged less than two-thirds
the number of opinions, and there was much less citation of legal
authority. In the Fifties, each case averaged about ten (9.83)
citations, and three (3.05) per opinion, while in the Sixties, each
case averaged three (3.3) citations, and one (1.3) per opinion.
The big difference lies in the dissenting opinions, which average
three citations per opinion in the Fifties, but less than one (0.4)
in the Sixties.
These qualitative findings are matched by the impression
gained from reading the opinions themselves. That they are not a
function of the simplicity of the cases and the issues they represent
can easily be seen if one compares the opinions in the Courts of
Appeal in the same cases or in the House of Lords on the same
issue. The Supreme Court opinions are very short and sparselyreasoned and almost all lengthier opinions consist in discussion
of the facts and the judge's jury trial. Although not one periodical
article was ever cited, texts are not infrequently used as authority
(thirty-two times, by comparison with 113 citations). The court's
techniques in using and assessing authorities are considered later
on.
When we look at the individual judges, the same impression
emerges. The relative use of precedent remains a good indicator
of the complexity of reasoning and argument. Fauteaux J. has the
highest average, the only close competitor being Ritchie J. though
no-one approaches Fauteux J. in the quality of his opinions. Cartwright and Taschereau JJ. are somewhere in the centre. Rand J.
rarely cited an opinion and this aptly indicated the contribution
he made to the quality of our law. The same judgment can be
made about Judson J. Later papers will deal with the general
validity of these conclusions.
Several tentative conclusions appear to emerge from this
analysis. Clear pro-defendant or pro-Crown attitudes appear to be
reflected in the mens rea decisions of Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.
respectively. Although several judges throughout the period voted
regularly in support of Cartwright J. he did not have the total
acquiescence, especially in opinion-concurrence, that Taschereau
J. gave Fauteux J. In recent years the dominant figure appeared
to be Ritchie J., who obtained the same kind of support from Martland J., usually headed the swing bloc which decided disputed
cases. In recent years this bloc and the Fauteux-Taschereau JJ.
duo, together with Judson J. who tends to oscillate between them,
appear to have taken control in this area.
Such non-random patterns of behaviour, when perceived along
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the attitudinal dimension, suggests the hypothesis that the prior law
in this area left substantial room for judicial discretion and policymaking. The figures relating to citation of authority reinforce this
conclusion by indicating the relative lack of concern of the court
with the sources in which established law might be found. At the
moment these remain hypotheses, though, and await some confirmation in detailed analyses of the court's approach to specific
areas of law. These are the subject of the next major section of
this article.
III. The Individual Legal Doctrines.
A. Mens Rea and Strict Liability.
Within this period of study, in three unrelated but very important decisions, the Supreme Court authoritatively established,
in verbal form at least, the principle of mens rea. By this I mean
that the court indicated that a requirement of mens rea was to be
presumed in interpreting all statutory crimes. However, it was
not to be considered an absolute requirement, because not only
could the legislature explicitly exclude it, but such an exclusion
could be inferred from the object or subject-matter of the legislation. Hence, the presumption is somewhat attenuated because the
court not only permits the legislature constitutionally to make innocent conduct criminal but it is also prepared to make this
decision itself (though disguising it as "interpretation" of what
is implied).
The first decision was The Queen v. Rees" where the defendant
had intercourse with a sixteen-year-old girl whom he was told
and honestly and reasonably believed to be eighteen. He was
charged with "knowingly or wilfully contributing to juvenile delinquency" under section 33(1) (b) of the British Columbia
Juvenile Delinquents Act. His defence was his lack of knowledge
of the fact the girl was a juvenile and thus an absence of mens rea.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-1 decision, reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal and held this to be a good defence.
The case is important because it was the first where the
Supreme Court was forced to articulate its role in the development
of the notion of criminal blameworthiness. In nineteenth century
English law, there were two strands of development concerning
mens rea, neither of which had authoritatively entered Canadian
law, at least so as to bind the Supreme Court. In certain traditional
crimes, the requirement of mens rea had been somewhat eroded
at least as regards knowledge of some of the elements making
conduct criminal." Another category of vaguely defined statutory,
" Supra, footnote 18.
" See R. v. Prince (1875), L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154; R. v. Tolson (1889),
23 Q.B.D. 168 and R. v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K.B. 119.
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public welfare offences was interpreted as, sometimes, impliedly
dispensing with the notion of fault." This case, Rees, involved the
problem of mens rea and the traditional mala in se, crime.
Even more interesting is that the facts here are so closely
analogous to the most celebrated of all mens rea cases, R. v.
Prince." The defendant there was charged with "unlawfully" removing a girl under sixteen from the custody of her father without his consent and claimed that he had an honest and reasonable
belief she was in fact 18. A variety of reasons were given by the
majority for the judgment that the defendant's beliefs about this
particular element were irrelevant and he ran the risk that he was
right about the age.
With this classic background, the stage was set for a clear
mandate from the Supreme Court concerning its attitude towards
mens rea. Its performance, though, was somewhat disappointing.
In this case, as in the field generally, the real debate is between
Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.27 Cartwright J.2 8 adopts a rather broad
perspective on the problem, though in a very sketchy way. First
of all, he refers to section 7(2) of the Code which purports to
preserve all common law defences, as a prelude to his discussion
of the basic maxim of the defence of mistake of fact. His citation
of certain references which support the principle includes Stephen's
classic statement in Tolson," and he is careful to counter with
another statement from Lord Goddard that the honesty and good
faith of the mistake is alone critical, and that its reasonableness is
purely evidentiary. He adopts certain language in Watts and Gaunt"
which creates a presumption of mens rea, and adds the presumption that this must apply to all the elements of the offence. There
follows the same technical distinction of Prince and the reference
to section 138(c). However, he concludes with consideration of
the sense of the problem, pointing out that the critical fact here in
" Beginning, it seems, with R. v. Woodrow (1846), 153 E.R. 907. See
Sayre, Public Welfare Offences (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 55.
26 Supra, footnote 24.
27 In the first three separate opinions, Kerwin, Taschereau, and Rand JJ.
define the issue as a very narrow, legalistic question of statutory interpretation. The legislature has used the word "knowingly" and references in
Williams, Criminal Law (1st ed., 1953), indicate that this establishes a
requirement of intent as regards all the elements of the offence. The Prince
case is distinguishable because the word used there was "unlawfully" rather
than "knowingly". To the policy argument that it is preferable to throw the
risk of ignorance on the defendant, the judges' response is simply that their
job is to discover the legislature's intent, rather than to develop its policy.
Intention can be gathered only from language, no distinction between the
elements of act and of age is indicated, and this lack of intent is corroborated by the statutory rape clause, s. 133(1), where Parliament did explicitly dispense with knowledge of the girl's age.
" In an opinion concurred in by Nolan J.
29 Supra, footnote 24.
30 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 505. This case is discussed in detail later on.
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altering the innocence or permissibility of the defendant's conduct
is the age of the girl. He would find it strange that Parliament
should want the knowledge of this key fact, and it alone, to be
legally irrelevant. Hence what characterizes Cartwright J.'s judgment is not that he ignores the technical legal problems in assessing
the relevant authoritative material-rather, he also sees the wider
significance of the problem, that a substratum of general common
law principle underlies the specific issues of interpretation, and that
this background structures certain attitudes or presumptions with
which the court must approach each narrow problem.
Fauteux J.'s dissenting opinion is also a more reflective one
than the first three, but curiously indifferent to the "legal" aspects
of the problem. He says that an earlier maxim requiring a guilty
mind for every criminal offence no longer obtains, even as a presumption. Instead one must look to the object and scope of each
statutory provision, in the light of purposive and remedial views
of the task of interpretation, to see how far knowledge is of the
essence. The object here is to protect children against juvenile
delinquency, but an honest and reasonable belief that this will not
be the effects of one's conduct would be no defence. Because it
need not apply to all elements, it should not apply to the question
of the child's age. In order to serve the object of protecting the
child, the accused must take the risk of the trier of fact agreeing
with him about how old she actually or apparently is. Fauteux J.
does not debate with Cartwright J. the established legal significance of the principle of mens rea, nor does he meet the arguments
relating to the word "knowingly" and the structure of section
138(1). He simply assumes that child protection legislation is
an over-riding goal which must be pursued to the exclusion of the
claims of mens rea.
There are two gaps in this case. First, most of the judges
treated it as simply a problem of assessing the significance of the
word "knowingly", and this kind of literal analysis would not
stand them in good stead when the vagaries of statutory draftsmanship faced them with the problem of deciding without any help
from the legislature at all. Secondly, even those judges who did
see the specific issue as an instance of a general, recurring problem did not address themselves at all to the policies which warrant the requirement of mens rea and the countervailing reasons for
excluding it in certain cases. Even if Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.
realized that the court was obliged to play an independent decisionmaking role in this area, one which required that they advert to
arguments about why they should move in one direction or another,
they give us only faint hints of that fact. This pattern carried
over into the next such case in the sequence.
In Beaver v. The Queen," the defendant was convicted of
"

[1957] S.C.R. 531.
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illegal possession of a narcotic drug. His defence was that he had
been led to believe by a confederate that he was going to sell sugar
of milk under the guise of the narcotic to another person who
turned out to be an undercover R.C.M.P. officer. This rather fantastic defence was not simply disbelieved by the trial judge because he held that lack of knowledge of what one possessed could
not be a defence under this Act. The decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal was reversed by the Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision,
with by far the most adequate opinions in this whole area.
Cartwright J." began with the same assumptions he made in
Rees. Mens rea must be presumed so that the innocent not be convicted, and this means actual knowledge is necessary, not just an
unreasonable mistake. He accepts, though, the existence in the
law of an exception for public welfare offences, but argued that
this exception did not apply here, for two reasons. This was not
analogous to obligations imposed on a businessman carrying on a
lawful trade, that he insure the quality of his goods, for instance.
Rather, the activity is one which is almost totally prohibited, and
thus this is not a regulatory offence. Second, and more important,
the offence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of six months
imprisonment. No case could be found where a crime of strict
responsibility required a jail sentence and Cartwright J. said he
would require a very clear statement by Parliament before he imputed such an intention to it.
Fauteux J." joined issue on this point. Although he was willing
to accept some kind of presumption of mens rea, he was not willing
to confine the exceptions to "public welfare" offences of a trivial
sort. He said that the scheme of the Act was to make all possession
prima facie unlawful, to establish "rigid controls" against the
"social evils" of the drug traffic. The enforcement sections of
the Act showed the "exceptional vigilance and firmness of Parliament . . . to cope with the unusual difficulties standing in the

way of the realization of its object". He pointed to the many
restrictions of substantive and procedural principles within the
Code-the powers of search and seizure, the writ of assistance,
the burden of proof, the minimum sentences, mandatory deportation, and so on. Because Parliament wanted the most efficient
protection possible, the "narrow construction" asked for by the
accused would defeat these objects, even "to reduce the whole
Act to waste paper" by requiring proof of knowledge. The draconian injustice of mandatory imprisonment for innocent accuseds
could be dealt with by discretionary powers, such as the Attorney
General's stay of prosecution or the free pardon available under
the royal prerogative.
Writing for the majority, which also included Locke and Rand JJ.
' 3 Whose dissenting opinion was concurred in by Abbott J.
3
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This basic difference in attitude which emerges so clearly is
probably more important than a second legalistic debate about
the relationship of section 4 and section 17. kauteux J. pointed out
that section 4, by its plain, literal and grammatical meaning, absolutely prohibited possession of certain drugs, that the definition
of possession must be developed in the context of this Act, and
that section 17 furnishes this context. There, a rebuttable presumption of possession of drugs in one's premises was created, which
could be defeated by proof of lack of knowledge by the accused.
Fauteux J. asked what sense it made to require the Crown to
prove actual knowledge where there was personal possession,
where no words in the statute even hinted at it. How important
Fauteux J. thought this argument is is interesting, in the light of his
complete failure to meet an almost exactly analogous contention in
Rees. He did point out that his conclusion was reached in Morelli'
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1931, and never changed by
Parliament.
Cartwright J.'s response is somewhat disappointing. For a time
he appears to be getting at the correct distinction, between possession of the drug, and the crime of being in possession of the
drug. Section 17 makes the occupier guilty of the actus reus of
possession if he knows of its presence on his premises, the same as
if he has it in his pocket. Under sections 17 and 4 both, though,
the problem remains whether someone who actually has possession
in an objective sense is guilty of a crime if he is mistaken about
the legally essential nature of what he possesses. Unhappily, Cartwright J. eventually finds for the accused on the grounds that
"possession" is not fulfilled if there is not the requisite knowledge.
Another opportunity to state a general theory of mens rea is
frittered away.
On both sides, though, there is complete failure to speak to the
general reasons in justification of mens rea or strict liability and,
thus there is almost a total lack of real joinder of issue. Both
opinions assume that there is a distinction between cases where
mens rea is necessary and those where it is not, but neither purports to create any general standard for making the distinction.
Nor could they intelligently formulate such a standard since at
no time do they advert to the purposes or aims of either mens rea
or strict liability.
Fauteux J. says that the legislature is very concerned that this
legislation may effectively be enforced but he at no time says why
mens rea will interfere in this effort or, if it will, how important
are the marginal gains in enforcement by comparison with the
losses engendered by strict liability. Cartwright J. looks at specific
facets of this legislation which distinguish it from those convention" [1932] 3 D.L.R. 611.
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ally called "public welfare" offences, carrying strict liability, but
this kind of analysis must of necessity be inconclusive. Until he
tells us why strict liability is necessary, we cannot know the instances in which these reasons make it necessary. Unless we know
why mens rea should be a precondition to imprisonment, we cannot justify pointing to a mandatory jail sentence as the basis for
our conclusion that mens rea is necessary for this offence. Cartwright J. and Fauteux J. continually refer to the question, does the
legislation impliedly exclude mens rea or not? They have not
sufficiently realized that it is the courts which have to make the
decision about mens rea, that where the statute is silent Parliament
has not already decided for them, and that they must give intelligently-founded reasons for the conclusions at which they arrive.'
The third and final case in this trilogy is R. v. King," one in
which the opinions appear terribly confused, perhaps because
neither Cartwright J. nor Fauteux J. participated, but also symptomatic of a general decline in quality in the Sixties. The defendant
was charged with driving a vehicle while his ability was impaired
by a drug, contrary to section 222 and 223 of the Code. There
was no doubt he had done so but his defence was that the drug
was administered by his dentist, that he was unaware of its
properties, and after he had begun driving its after-effects suddenly
made him unconscious. The trial judge found against him, the
Court of Appeal for him, and the Supreme Court agreed with the
latter by a 5-0 vote."
The first opinion is that of Taschereau J. who also concurs
with Ritchie J.'s opinion, which is strange because they disagree in
their reasons. Taschereau J. tries to distinguish intention from
mens rea, saying that one must have an act proceeding from a
person's free will. There can be no voluntary act of a driver
when a doctor injects the latter with a drug of whose effects on
his mind he is unaware. On the other hand, if a person voluntarily
takes liquor or drugs of whose effect he is aware and then drives,
lack of intention at this second point will not be a defence.
3 Fortunately the British Columbia Court of Appeal used Beaver, supra,
footnote 31, as an authority to extend the mens rea principle to the "importing" section of Narcotic Control Act where "possession" was not in
point: R. v. Boyer (1968), 4 C.R.N.S. 127.
" Supra, footnote 12.
" Locke J., writing and Judson J. concurring with him, did not decide
on the basis of principle, but rather because they believed that the trial
judge's findings of fact precluded holding that the defendant was unaware
of the properties of the drug and that it would likely impair him. Because
the Crown did not appeal on this basis, though, they would dismiss its appeal. For these reasons we would have to characterize their positions as
neutral concerning the question of the mental element in this kind of driving
offence. The other judges, who did get to this issue of principle that had
been debated at the lower level, were able to hold the defence was made
out despite the ambiguous factual situation of earlier warnings, a signed
release, amnesia, etc.
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Taschereau J. says there can be no conviction here as an offence,
because "there can be no actus reus unless it is the result of a
willing mind at liberty to make a definite choice or decision".
What Taschereau J. appears to have been getting at was a
distinction between intention and voluntary act, corresponding
somewhat to mens rea and actus reus respectively, one which had
developed in certain recent Commonwealth cases of automatism.
Automatic states of unconsciousness preclude any decision to engage in conduct at all, a much more basic defect in a person's
mental capacity than his ignorance of the circumstances or consequences of his conduct." Such defects have been held to be
more comparable to forced bodily movements or spasmodic muscular reactions than to simple mistake or accident. The significance of this for our purposes is that, while mens rea offences
would necessarily include some reference to this cognitive incapacity, the opposite was not true. Certain offences might be
read as requiring conscious voluntary action by the defendant
while not excusing such conduct because of further ignorance
of circumstances or result. In fact, such had been the apparent
conclusion in a recent English decision about driving legislation." This case raised this very important question in a rather
different fashion, because of coalescence of two different actions
in the offence, drinking and then driving. Taschereau J.'s response
is not only quite inadequate, but it is also the only explicit handling
of the problem in the Supreme Court."
" See Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility, from Punishment and
Responsibility (1968), Ch. 4.
9 Hill v. Baxter (1958), 1 Q.B. 277.
4 Strangely enough the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have decided that automatism can be a complete excuse in the criminal law without ever having mentioned it, in the case of R. v. Bleta, [1964] S.C.R. 561.
Why this is so can be gathered from the following passage from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hartridge (1966), 57 D.L.R.
(2d) 332, at p. 348:
"I think it must be taken that both the Court of Appeal for Ontario and
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the defence of automatism
in R. v. Bleta, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 190, 41 C.R. 377, [1964] 1 O.R. 485
(C.A.), and [1965] 1 C.C.C. 1, 44 C.R. 193, [1964] S.C.R. 561. In that
case the accused was charged with non-capital murder. At the trial his
defence was that in the course of the fight between himself and the
deceased, he was knocked and pushed to the sidewalk and his head
struck the pavement. As a result of the injuries so sustained, it was
contended that the stabbing of the deceased was an unconscious act
for which the accused could not be held criminally responsible. The jury
brought in a verdict of not guilty and an appeal was taken by the Crown.
The Crown based its appeal on the ground that certain evidence that had
been admitted was not admissible. The Court of Appeal gave effect to
this argument and ordered a new trial. A further appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court of Canada, where the appeal was allowed and the
verdict of acquittal restored. While the latter judgment is an authoritative
pronouncement in respect to the issue upon which the appeal was decided, the restoration of the verdict of acquittal must be construed as
acceptance of the defence of automatism as disclosed by the evidence."
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The offence, here, consists of the conjunction of conduct
(driving) and a condition (impairment). King knowingly took the
drug which caused the impairment and then voluntarily began to
drive the car. However, the combination of impairment and
driving occurred at a moment when King became unconscious.
Though the state of automatism does seem to obtain here, it is
the unintended and accidental result of voluntary action. The
distinctive and confusing facet of this case is that the consequence
of the earlier conduct is itself a subjective effect in the mental
condition of the accused. Hence Taschereau J. was a little too
hasty in saying that intention, which refers to consequences, was
unimportant in this case.
Nor is this simply a matter of precise analysis since the case
could have led to a more adequate understanding of the mens rea
doctrine. Since it was faced with a state which fits somewhere
between the excuse of involuntary conduct on the one hand and
accident and mistake on the other, the court could have demonstrated the inconsistency in the policy of founding certain offences
on strict liability and still requiring a voluntary act as part of the
actus reus. The evil in a strict liability case is that we punish
someone who cannot meaningfully be said to have chosen to break
the criminal law because of his ignorance. If we are willing to
do this, it is hard to see why we single out as a distinctive defect
an inability to choose to act, as a result of automatism or otherwise.
The final judgment, that of Ritchie J.,' does not have to deal
with that point because it resolves the mens rea against strict
liability issue in favour of the former. The basis for this decision
was quite legalistic,' but probably right. However, the dangers of
judicial concern for practical policy in the face of basic principle,
especially when expressed in obiter dicta, is amply illustrated by
the last part of his opinion. Ritchie J. seemed to establish a rebuttable presumption of the natural consequences of our conduct, one
which refers to reasonable grounds for expecting impairment, apThe unanimous judgment of the court was given by Ritchie J. and was
concurred in by Cartwright, Fauteux, Judson, Spence, Martland, and Hall
JJ. Because this is a very important substantive issue, and the court's decision is decisive for it, I included this case in each of the tables, on the
assumption the judges realized they were making this choice of policy and
principle.
41 Concurred in by Martland J.
4 He cites the same English cases as did Cartwright J. earlier and follows Beaver in the strong presumption in favour of mens rea. Instead of
trying to develop a rationale justifying and defining the exceptions, he
quotes and applies a test from Halsbury, "is it criminal in any real sense?"
and holds that it is, because of the great danger to others and because
of the Beaver criterion of mandatory imprisonment (here for subsequent
offences). He cites an Australian case in support (Proudman v. Dayman
(1941), 67 C.L.R. 536), and then half4heartedly distinguishes the English
precedent, Armstrong v. Clark, [1957] 2 Q.B. 391.
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pealing to Holmes, The Common Law," for justification of an
objective standard about matters of common experience which an
individual must know at his peril. All of this rather dangerous language is apparently designed to head off any reliance on this decision by those who would say they voluntarily drank liquor and then
drove without realizing their ability had become impaired. Although
Ritchie J. speaks of a rebuttable presumption that men know the
natural consequences of their conduct, he also refers to reasonable grounds for expecting impairment, and quotes Holmes to the
effect that "common experience" must be known at an individual's
peril. The fact that this reasoning remains in an authoritative
majority opinion in a Supreme Court decision, makes it available
to a future Crown Attorney who might want to import all or
most of the D.P.P. v. Smith" objective test of mens rea into
Canada. Ritchie J. does not refer at all to the implications for
his position of O'Grady v. Sparling," which, as we shall see, had
just laid down the standard of advertent recklessness for "criminal
negligence in driving", an offence immediately contiguous to this
one in the Code. Nor does he seem aware of the medical concept
of pathological reaction to alcohol or the real lay ignorance about
certain drugs, and the injustice his unnecessary dicta will work in
relation to them.
The lower courts of Canada have been faced with the task of
translating and elaborating the implications of these cases for the
vast number of statutory offences which are created. There are two
important aspects to this function: first, can we articulate a standard by which we may intelligently distinguish the mens rea and
strict liability offences; second, are these the only two alternatives
to the problem of individual guilt, or is there a third and perhaps
better solution for the "public welfare" offence?
It is fair to say that the intellectual case for strict liability is
very debatable," but it could be argued that the principle was
(1881), p. 57.
"[1961] A.C. 290.
"Supra, footnote 10.
"The case for strict liability depends on a set of distinct but related assumptions which, when read together, indicate pretty clearly the kind of
statutory offences for which they are relevant. The purpose of the offences
is the protection of the safety and welfare of a large potential group of victims. This requires the attainment of a high degree of care in performance
of the activity which engenders these risks. Strict liability will help attain
this higher quality of performance in several ways. If any mistake or
mishap will attract liability, there will be a great incentive to take all possible steps to avoid any such mistakes or mishaps. In a negative sense, strict
liability removes a possible defence which could be fraudulently used and
thus enhances general deterrence by announcing to the world that no loophole exists in the legislation. Finally, because the need for such care is
associated primarily with special, defined activities (driving a car, selling
meat, handling certain products, etc.), the possibility of strict liability will
exclude from the field of such activity those who are not confident of their
4
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established in the fabric of the common law of criminal guilt and
the Supreme Court should not have tried to root it out." However,
if the judges were to continue the principle in these first cases at
the Supreme Court level, they were under an obligation to make
sense of it, to formulate a theory which pointed out the relevant
facets of different offences for making the decision about strict
liability. There are hints in the court's opinions about the significance of certain factors-mandatory imprisonment, the need for
protection of public safety, the essentially civil, rather than criminal character of the offence-but there is no systematic statement of these factors in any integrated meaningful fashion.
As a consequence, it is obvious that the lower courts have had
great difficulty in discerning the true path of the law in this area.
It is true that where the statutes are closely analogous to those
dealt with in the principal cases, little difficulty may be encountered." Yet the vast majority of these cases deal with different
ability to avoid all mistakes, however blameless.
Of course, it has been argued that such a case for strict liability has
not and cannot be empirically demonstrated. On the contrary, analysis
might reveal a tendency towards lesser care, either because even the greatest
care will be no defence, or because conviction of the innocent creates
cynicism and disrespect for the dictates of the law. The response to the
latter would be that administrative discretion would exclude the prosecution
(and thus conviction) of those clearly without fault. Moreover, the cost
of criminal conviction of even the innocents who do slip through the net of
administrative judgment is very low. If they are without fault, they will be
sentenced only to pay a fine, which will be small because of their innocence.
These essentially regulatory offences which involve conduct creating the risk
of harm, and rarely involve personal injury or property damage to a particular victim, do not carry the stigma usually associated with criminal
conviction. They are not "real crimes" in the eyes of the public.
Again these arguments are not unambiguously valid. If evidence of innocence is relevant to sentence, then this contravenes the argument that
proof or disproof of fault just is too great a burden in time and money for
the vast bulk of regulatory offences. It introduces too much discretion into
sentencing as well as prosecutions, decisions which are made by lower
government officials. The use of the criminal law process necessarily attracts some of the stigma and its effects on reputation which pervades its
new traditional uses. Moreover, deliberately to try to minimize this effect
is to sacrifice the best instrument for implementing these standards of conduct, all for the easier imposition of relatively insignificant penalties. And
if, as is often the case, the real deterrent in public regulatory offences stems
from subsequent loss of licences and other such appurtenances, then the
imposition of these penalties indiscriminately on the blameless and the
blameworthy does raise serious problems of justice.
" Though a very sophisticated attempt was made by the County Court
judge in R. v. Patterson, [1964] 1 O.R. 628.
"8 King is followed in Rushton (1967), 1 C.C.C. 87 and Liston (1967),
1 C.C.C. 87 (a different drug under s. 223) and McCormack (1963), 1
C.C.C. 359 (Sask. C.A.) (s. 222). Beaver was followed in Lainer (1968),
29 C.C.C. 297, Hall (1961), 131 C.C.C. 172 and Guiney (1961), 130
C.C.C. 407, the latter two dealing with possession for purposes of trafficking,
and in Boyer, supra, footnote 35, which dealt with importing drugs under
the same Act. Rees was used in Stundon (1962), 40 W.W.R. 656, dealing
with the same section, and in Watson (1964), 51 M.P.R. 103 where a
different statute (selling intoxicants to a minor) also used the word "knowingly".
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regulatory offences which raise the same issue of principle. As to
these, the Supreme Court's efforts have been extremely unhelpful.
In several cases, they are not even cited as the lower court
rests content with English or other Canadian authority."
Perhaps the best example of lack of guidance from the court
is the use of King in driving offences. Opposite conclusions were
reached in Wehage" and Patterson,"both of which dealt with the
provincial highway traffic offence of driving on the wrong side
of the centre line. The latter held that this was a driving offence
and that the strong presumption in favour of mens rea was not
rebutted. The former argued, though, that King dealt essentially
with a criminal offence relating to driving. This was a provincial
offence, regulating traffic for safety purposes, and mens rea is
relevant only to sentence. Even in such a closely related offence,
the Supreme Court gives no guidance at all, and essential ad
hominem inconclusive arguments are all that are left.
Pattersonwas overruled by McIver," where the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that careless driving did not require proof of mens
rea. One of the opinions (that of Porter C.J.) suggested that this
offence was one of strict liability. The other opinion (MacKay
J.'s), applied his distinctive theory that fault could be available as
a defence if the accused proved that he committed the offence
despite all reasonable care. The case was appealed by the accused
to the Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal but felt the only
issue of importance was the Mann" problem. Because it chose not
to elaborate on the implications of King, our highway traffic law
continues without intelligent direction from the court.
To a certain extent this lack of influence is attributable, or so
I believe, to a tendency in Beaver et al. to speak of the decision for
or against mens rea as essentially a legislative one. The legislation
4 This is true in Rouy, MacCallum and Associates, [1967] 1 O.R. 488
under the Atomic Energy Control Act, where strict liability is found, after
a rather nice, analysis of the great danger, tight administrative regulation,
limitation of use to a very few experts, and the conclusion that they should
act at their peril. A similar conclusion was reached in Perreau (1967), 60
W.W.R. 382 and Babiak (1967), 60 W.W.R. 689 ("purple gas") and Industrial Tankers, [1968] 2 O.R. 142 (water pollution) with no reference
at all to the Supreme Court trilogy. On the other hand, in Mussalem
(1967), 62 W.W.R. 383 (supplying liquor to minor), V. K. Mason Construction Ltd. (1968), 3 C.C.C. 62 (construction safety) and Pierce Fisheries (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 80 (selling undersized lobster), different courts
all arrived at the requirement of mens rea, with no real help from the
court. They cite Beaver (or Watts & Gaunt in the third case) but only to
get to the English principle-essentially Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1
Q.B. 918-which they then proceed to apply as their basic reason. Pierce
Fisheries was very recently reversed by the Supreme Court, by a nine-man
bench, Ritchie J. writing the majority opinion, and Cartwright J. delivering
a lone dissent. See (1970), 5 C.C.C. 193.
so (1962), 41 W.W.R. 362.
' Supra, footnote 47.
52

[1965] 2 O.R. 475.

"3 Mann v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 238.
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is said to exclude mens rea either explicitly or implicitly, and the
search is on for the legislative intent, rather than for reasons which
justify a judicial decision one way or the other. Of course, this
is myth and rhetoric, as is shown by a debate which was carried
on in the Supreme Court, and in the lower courts, concerning the
nature of mens rea. Although Cartwright J. had earlier insisted
that mens rea was negated by an honest mistake with reasonableness being merely evidence of bona fides, Ritchie J. disagreed in
King as we have seen. The dispute has carried over into the lower
courts, with little or no reference to what the legislature might
have thought.
Ritchie J.'s dictum has carried the day, without discussion,
in the immediate area of impaired driving. In Liston," the court
found reasonable and honest ignorance of the impairing effects
of a drug. However, in Rushton," the Ritchie J. distinction resulted in conviction. Though there was no doubt of the honesty of
the defendant's belief, he had not introduced any evidence to rebut
the presumption that he should have known, from common experience, of the drug's effects.
What makes this development of wider interest is the suggestion that has emerged from Australian cases and literature" that
the best resolution of the competing interests in the regulatory
offence context is the requirement that the accused disprove the
presumption that reasonable care would have avoided his prima
facie offence. By definition this requires the kind of care which
we want under the statute; it eases the problems and costs of
proving some kind of fault, while avoiding most, if not all, of the
injustice of convicting the truly innocent. Unfortunately, neither
Cartwright J. nor Ritchie J. spoke to this problem in their discussions of the nature of mens rea and neither sought to isolate
the specific "public welfare" offence for the treatment of negligence.
Happily our lower courts have been aware of and have
thoughtfully discussed this alternative. Unfortunately their arguments and conclusions are not terribly conclusive. In Industrial
Tankers Ltd.," negligence is rejected and strict liability is imposed, essentially because of the uncertainty which would be
created by introducing distinctions into mens rea. However, there
is already a very confused and difficult distinction between mens
rea and strict liability. This proposal merely suggests the substitution of negligence for the latter which can only improve the distinction. This was tacitly recognized by the judgment in V. K. Mason
Construction Ltd." but Lieff J. finally rests on some relatively
" Supra, footnote 48.
ibid.
0 See Morris and Howard, Strict Responsibility, in Studies in Criminal
Law (1964), p. 197.
58 Ibid.
" Supra, footnote 49.
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unhelpful statutory language. Hence, he does not persuade the
Nova Scotia court in Pierce Fisheries,"which has one of the best
analyses of the problem in the whole of the Canadian law. This
case recognizes that this is a problem of basic principle in the criminal law and that the arguments for strict liability are often spurious. However, it eventually comes down to legislative arguments
and rejects the "half-way house" of negligence. There is insufficient recognition of the established facts of strict liability in "public welfare" offences in Canadian law, and thus no contribution to a
mutation of strict liability into negligence where it does obtain.
The one judge who seems perfectly aware of the implications of
this "halfway house", the Australian development of it, and its importance for criminal law in this area is Mr. Justice MacKay of
the Ontario Court of Appeal. He has systematically formulated
his theory in opinions in King," McIvor" and McAuslane62 with
explicit reference to the authorities. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has never even mentioned his argument notwithstanding
the fact that it has heard and decided appeals from both King
and McIver." In this, as in many other corners of this area of law,
what the Supreme Court would have us do remains moot.
B.

The Reach of Fault: Herein of Mistake of Fact and of Law.
Once a court reaches the decision that the presumption of mens
rea is not rebutted in a specific offence, it is next necessary to see
whether any particular kinds of mistake are excluded from this
doctrine. An example of this kind of problem is Rees" where it
was argued that, even if mens rea was generally required as to the
elements of the offence, this should not be true of the specific
issue of the age of the victim. In the absence of clear authoritative
judgment of the legislature, the rational way of deciding such a
question is to consider whether the gains to be achieved by such a
course outweigh the costs resulting from the narrowing of the
principle.
A general, recurring, such problem is whether mistakes of law
warrant the defence of lack of mens rea. At the common law, it
was traditional to regard such mistakes as not an excuse in
criminal law and section 19 of the Criminal Code codifies this
position." It is obvious that the basic policies underlying the requirement of blameworthiness for criminal guilt render it prima
" Ibid.
'OR. v. King (1961), 129 C.C.C. 391 (Ont. C.A.).
01 Supra, footnote 52, at p. 480.
62 [1968] 1 O.R. 209.
- [1966] S.C.R. 254.
"Supra, footnote 18.
61 "Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an
excuse for committing that offence". Section 19 of Criminal Code, supra,
footnote 4.
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facie unfair to convict someone of an offence under a statute
which he did not know existed. Nonetheless, this injustice has
traditionally been supported for two reasons.
First of all, it may be very difficult to make a rational decision
about the presence or absence of the relevant knowledge of the
criminal law. Unlike matters of fact, which are related to a specific
occasion, proof or disproof of ignorance of the law might require
investigation of all of the possible opportunities the defendant
might have had for learning about the law in his previous life.66
Not only will the costs of avoiding this injustice be great, but
also the degree of unfairness in the doctrine may be minimal.
Because the criminal law represents the moral values of a community, a person who is in breach of them can and should be
treated as blameworthy if he disregards them," even if he shows
that it was impossible for him to be aware of the implementing
law."
It is probable that these considerations were in the minds of
judges who created the doctrine, and only in the rare case of
someone who newly entered the jurisdiction and was unaware
of its mores could the defendant legitimately claim any injustice."
In a modern administrative state with its proliferation of technical
and poorly-publicized regulations, the balance may well have
shifted sufficiently to warrant some re-examination of the doctrine,
and an adventurous court has many legitimate legal avenues for
achieving this. As regards its statutory foundation, the doctrine is
presently incorporated only in the Code while most of the situations where a claim of ignorance could fairly be made arise in
federal or provincial regulatory legislation which is quite unconnected with the Code. An exception has been developed in the
case of offences arising under subordinate legislation which has
not yet been published, in an opinion which intelligently differentiates such a law from a statute which must be enacted only after
several readings in Parliament." Unfortunately, this has been the
sole example of judicial rethinking of the basic doctrine up to now."
This outline of the background of the doctrine is necessary
in order to understand and assess the contribution made by our
66 See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1960), pp.
378-379.
7 Ibid., p. 382 et seq.
168 E.R. 651, where
6 A classic example being R. v. Bailey (1800),
the law was passed while accused was on a ship on the ocean, and the
offence was committed on the ship.
6
are R. v. Esop (1836), 173 E.R. 203; R. v. Barronet
9Examples
(1852), 169 E.R. 633.
'o See R. v. Ross (1944), 84 C.C.C. 107; R. v. Lim Chin Aik, [1963]
A.C. 160.
" Though the U.S. Supreme Court did see the peculiar injustice in the
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" doctrine in the case of omissions, in
Lambert v. California (1957), 355 U.S. 225.
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Supreme Court which has so far been confined to the area of
"claim of right". Somewhere between the paradigm cases of pure
ignorance of law and pure ignorance of fact is the well-established
common law defence of "claim of right", especially in connection
with theft and other property defences." Such a defence is required
if for no other reason than that the distinction between law and
fact is itself a somewhat ambiguous point on a rather shadowy
spectrum." The effort of the court to give some content to the
"claim of right" defence, and to limit the mistake of law exception
to the basic mens rea principle in the light of relevant objectives
of both doctrines can only be described as an intellectual disaster.
The two early cases where the basic issues were first raised
were Watts and Gaunt' and Shymkowich." Both arose out of the
same factual background, the salvage of timber logs in British
Columbia, and in both the Supreme Court reversed the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, the second time when the Court of
Appeal followed the Supreme Court's first decision. In Watts and
Gaunt, the defendants were British Columbia beachcombers who
collected logs belonging to the lumber companies, and customarily
received forty per cent of their value as salvage from the owner
whose mark the logs bore. When the defendants recovered logs
belonging to a company, one which had followed the practice for
" See R. v. Hall (1828), 172 E.R. 477; R. v. Bernhard, [1938] 2 K.B.
264 (C.C.A.).
" An example may best show what I mean about this inherently tenuous
character of the distinction between law and fact. A person living in a
jurisdiction, who has been married before, may go through another marriage ceremony and be prosecuted for bigamy. He may say that he does
not know it is a crime to try to be married twice in the jurisdiction and that
he thought polygamy legal. Such a defence would fail under, the old rule
now incorporated in section 19 of the Code. As we have seen, a person is
supposed to be aware of the legal standards of conduct in the place where
he lives, especially where these standards are more or less coextensive with
accepted mores within the community. On the other hand, though, three
other defences might be asserted: first, the defendant thought his first wife
dead (mistake of fact); second, the defendant thought his first marriage
ended by an out-of-jurisdiction divorce which he mistakenly believed valid
(a mistake about divorce law); third, he felt his divorce was valid because
of a belief he had acquired domicile where he got the divorce (a mistake
about how the legal standard was to be applied to the agreed-to facts).
Hence, besides distinguishing between the general standards of criminal
law and the factual accounts of what has happened, we must also distinguish (1) the application of these general standards to specific cases;
(2) the legal character of general rules in other areas of law, and (3) the
validity of specific judgments about individual status, property rights, etc.,
under the latter rules, where these are necessary to the rules of criminal
law. The point of the claim of right defence is to equate mistakes about
civil law, where they become relevant to a criminal offence, to mistakes of
fact and thus to allow them to negative mens rea. Not only is it completely
unrealistic to expect ordinary citizens to be aware of the intricacies of
civil law but it is also unnecessary because we have civil courts to dispose
of the essentially private disputes which these cases invariably involve.
' 4Supra, footnote 30.
' Supra, footnote 21.
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five years, the company demanded possession of the logs. The defendants refused until they got the money and were prosecuted
and convicted under section 394(b). The British Columbia Court
of Appeal held that proof of "fraud" was not necessary under
section 394(b) (as it was under section 394(a)) and upheld the
conviction. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and ordered
acquittal.
Most of the judgments are short, sparse, and confused. Cartwright J. simply says that mens rea was essential here and did not
obtain, without saying why. Taschereau J. said that the defendants
had an honest impression the owners had tacitly consented; Rand
J. held that they had a reasonable belief in the permission to salvage the logs for forty per cent. Of course, this ignores the fact that
the defendants had no such impression of the owner's position after
the latter's demand. Kellock, Fauteux, and Locke JJ. appear to say
that the existence of the custom created a right in the defendants
to retain the logs until the owners paid compensation. Of course,
if this is the case, the defendants are not mistaken at all; they have
committed no offence because they were perfectly within their
legal rights to retain the logs. Yet, although a contractual right to
compensation may arise on these facts, it is hard to see how the
defendants rightfully claimed a possessory lien to enforce it.
Estey J.'s judgment, while longer, is so only because it reproduces the facts and the statute. He said that the grammatical
structure and legislative history of the statute led to the conclusion
that "fraud" is required for every sub-section, including section
394(b). Even if it does not, the presumption of mens rea is not
excluded because he feels the nature of this offence is simply to
prevent theft, and not to promote public safety, health, or morality.
Estey J. approvingly cites Bank of N.S.W. v. Piper"for the proposition that an "honest and reasonable belief in the existence of
facts" may excuse. All of this ignored what should have been obvious, that at the time of the company's demand, there was no
mistake about the relevant facts, the only misapprehension (if it
was one at all) relating to the defendant's legal right to retain
the logs on these facts. In fact, Estey J.'s judgment at one point
appears to state that the defendants did have the right to a lien
here, despite the whole tenor of his opinion which is concerned
with mens rea in this situation.
However this situation be characterized, though, it seems obvious that the policy behind section 19 should not apply to convict
the defendants. They were aware of their obligations under the
criminal statutes and their doubts about an essentially private dispute concerned the proprietary and contractual rights to possesion
upon which the law of theft must depend. This was an obvious
16

[1897] A.C. 383 (P.C.).
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area for which the common law doctrine of claim of right was
designed and yet it was not even mentioned. This did not hurt the
defendants, Watts and Gaunt, but it was unfortunate for Shymkowich, the accused in the next case.
In this case, a company leased a booming ground from the
provincial government in the Fraser River and marked it with
periodic "dolphins". Within this ground, it had a boom full of
logs which was tied to the shore. The defendant went out looking
for logs and saw two of them floating in the booming ground,
though somewhat removed from the boom. He took them out,
sold them to a third party, and was prosecuted. He claimed that
he thought he was doing nothing wrong and the trial judge was
willing to find he thought these logs might have floated into the
booming ground from up the river. The judge also characterized
the sale as essentially the assignment of the forty per cent salvage
rights referred to earlier. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
relied upon Watts and Gaunt to uphold the acquittal here, and
the Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-1, found Shymkowich guilty
of theft of the logs under section 396.
Rand J." characterized the defence as one of mistake of law
and referred to Kenny" and section 19 to show this would not
work. He recognized that, especially in this area, the distinction
between law and fact was difficult. Though he characterized
ownership as "factual", albeit dependent on law, he said that one
must distinguish between justifying an act as authorized by law
and a bona fide belief in a property interest. Yet surely Shymkowich's mistake was simply as to the reach of the custom-founded
defence already upheld in Watts and Gaunt, and this belief in turn
rested upon the mistaken belief about where the logs came from.
Ownership is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
right to take property, and thus should not be the critical factor
on which belief about the right turns." The trouble with Rand J.'s
distinction is that it takes no account of the relevant policies in the
area, something which is particularly unfortunate when there was
no binding authority requiring him to draw the line where he did.
Estey J."o also held Shymkowich guilty but for other reasons.
He characterized the mistake as essentially one of fact, and then
said that the accused did not have an honest and reasonable belief in a set of facts which could excuse him. He argues that only
if the defendant thought they were lost or abandoned could he
have a right to take them, and he could not have this belief when
they were in the possession or control of the person in the boom" Taschereau J. concurring.
* Outlines of Criminal Law (1952 ed.), p. 48.
" There is a direct and classic authority for this proposition-R. v.
Boden (1844), 174 E.R. 863.
so Fauteux J. concurring.
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ing ground. In his reasoning, he appears to distinguish his own
Watts and Gaunt decision on the grounds that that was a question
of the relative rights between owner and salvager (something
which is totally inconsistent with his reasoning there about mistake of fact). Yet he ignores two salient points: first, the trial
judge held that the defendant believed the logs in the booming
ground had drifted down the river; second, the defendant also
believed he had a right to salvage someone else's drifting logs
from a booming ground into which they had floated. Since Estey J.
was supposed to be bound by these trial findings about the defendant's mistaken state of mind, he clearly failed to deal with the
salient issue raised by this case, the continued existence of the
common law colour of right defence to theft offences under the
Code (a defence supported and reiterated by the very texts" the
majority were citing to their own purposes).
Nor can we say that this issue was not raised on appeal since
it was the basis of Locke J.'s vigorous dissent. He cited the relevant texts and cases' which showed that the definition of theft incorporated a negative reference to "colour of right" and concluded
that this carried over into the Code. Section 19 was held inapplicable not because this was not a question of law, but because there
is no offence of theft at all if items are taken or kept under a mistaken belief of one's proprietary rights to them. Surely Locke J.
is right in his assumption that the civil law defining the various
rights to property is too complex to justify imposing the risk of
criminal prosecution on one who acts in a good faith belief in
the legality of his possession. The civil courts are available and
should be used for resolving such disputes.
It is fair to say that these cases, to the extent that they are
significant, have badly muddied the developing law in Canada. The
same court which requires a presumption of mens rea as a protection of the citizen against conviction and punishment has given no
hint that it perceives any inconsistency in an extreme interpretation
of the opposite presumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse. A court which perceived this inconsistency, and realized that
the ignorance of the law doctrine was developed in a special historical situation might have used these cases as the starting point
in the necessary task of reconciling the doctrine with the policies
of the mens rea principle to the extent that this is consistent with
the language of section 19. For example, the doctrine refers to
"ignorance of the law" but I suppose that most of the cases which
actually arise are better described as "mistake of law". They involve defendants who know of the existence of a law which makes
" Kenny, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 241; Halsbury, Laws of England (2nd
ed., 1939-42), vol. 11, p. 497, and Stephen, History of the Criminal Law
of England. vol. 3 (1883), p. 124.
82 Esp. Bernhard, supra, footnote 72.
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certain conduct criminal but who are mistaken about its precise
application. They have often taken reasonable steps to learn of the
legality of their conduct and may have relied on the very plausible
advice of lawyers before acting." Neither the purpose nor the
language of the basic rule seems to require the exclusion of the
defence. However, unfortunately, our courts have so far not chosen
to make such a distinction and thus advance the policies of the
mens rea principle."
There are two intellectually defensible attempts to come to grips
with these problems in Canadian law, although their attention
to principle is considerably hampered by the necessity of dealing
with the authority of Shymkowich." In Pace,8 6 the accused was a
cook in the R.C.A.F. who took a cake home rather than see it
go into the garbage. His conviction for theft was upheld by the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal largely on the authority of Shymkowich. It appeared that the accused did not believe the cake was
abandoned such that he became the "owner" of it; rather he believed that it was of no value to the owner, that the latter would
not object to his taking it, and thus he acted with the honest belief
that he had a right to take the cake. The court held that this defence, even if established on the facts, would not be valid in law.
It followed Rand and Taschereau JJ. in Shymkowich to the effect
that mistake of law was irrelevant in theft cases by reason of
section 19, except where it related to ownership where it was
8 An American case, Long v. State (1949), 65 A.2d 489, has made this
a defence.
84
The leading Canadian cases are R. v. Dalley (1957), 118 C.C.C. 116
(Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Myers Cattle Company and Oliphant (1965), 3 C.C.C.
87 (Sask. C.A.). One of the best critiques of the whole problem is Brett,
Mistake of Law as a Criminal Defence (1966), 5 Melbourne L. Rev. 179.
' Supra, foonote 21. Two further cases decided by the Supreme Court
itself totally ignored the complexities of the problem, and the implications
of its own two precedents, and focused simply on the facts and addresses
to the jury. In both Laroche, supra, footnote 17, and Lemire, supra, footnote 14, the court reversed the Ontario and Quebec Courts of Appeal
respectively and found against the accuseds' claim of good faith belief in
legal authority. In each case there was wrongful misappropriation of money
by the accused and in both cases it was under the direction of the accuseds'
superiors. The court rejected the defence on the facts, tacitly assuming (or
so it seems) its general validity if the existence of the belief is supported
by the evidence. As usual, it does not speak to the legal question involved
when it dismisses for want of substantial injustice. No mention is made of
the contrasting conclusions to be drawn from Watts, supra, footnote 30,
and Shymkowich, supra, footnote 21, about whether a mistake of law
could ever be a defence as the Courts of Appeal believe (again without
mention of these). Of interest are the divisions in these cases, which largely
conform to our pattern, though the reasons are purely fact-oriented.
In Laroche, Judson J. wrote for the majority in favour of conviction,
Fauteux, Abbott, and Martland JJ. concurring. Cartwright and Spence JJ.
wrote dissenting opinions, the latter one is joined in by Hall J. In Lemire,
Martland J. wrote for the majority convicting the accused, with Fauteux,
Abbott and Ritchie JJ. agreeing, while Taschereau and Cartwright JJ. dissented, Spence J. concurring in the latter's opinion.
86 (1965), 3 C.C.C. 55.
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essentially a "factual" matter. Though Locke J. dissented on this
point, Estey and Fauteux JJ. were neutral, and this court preferred Rand J.'s view (and rejected the text writers)." The opinion
is an extremely good analytical dissection of the issues and treatment of the relevant authorities, both case and textual.
A contrary conclusion was reached, a year later, by the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Howson." Here the accused towed a person's
car from a private lot where it was trespassing and the court
agreed that Howson had a right to do so. However, the latter refused to deliver up the car until towing and storage charges were
paid, as he did not have a right to do. The Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for theft, because of the defendant's bona fide
and honest belief in his legal right to retain the car till the charges
were paid. The court held that the theft was excused by a belief
in a claim of right which was valid, even if misconceived, and
whether or not the misconception related to the facts, law, or mixture of both. It read the course of authorities89 as defending the
proposition of principle (contrary to Pace) and held that Shymkowich was not inconsistent with them. Locke J.'s opinion was
held to be tacitly approved by Estey and Fauteux JJ., although not
found to be substantiated on the facts (though here the court
spoke of the honesty rather than the reasonablenessof the mistake).
The recent Court of Appeal decision in Laroche was held to be
inconsistent with the Rand J. (and Taschereau J.) position," and
the Ontario court felt that the Supreme Court reversal of Laroche
was purely factual and thus tacitly approved the general legal principle.
Thus we see that four times the Supreme Court has been directly faced with this important issue of principle. Never once has
it adequately analysed it or seen its roots in common law and
statutory history. Never once has it assessed the competing social
claims which underlie the basic issue. Except for the sparsely
reasoned judgment of Rand J., never once has it stated clearly
the rule it proposed to adoot to deal with the issue. It is impossible
not to believe that this lack of clarity results from the lack of historical, analytical, and evaluative treatment. Canadian law is left
with the direct conflict between two provincial Courts of Appeal.
C.

The Varieties of Fault: Herein of Accident.
The concept of mens rea, the subjective element in the commission of crime, obviously must be understood in relation to the
objective requirements for this offence. These objective elements,
Citine Williams and Turner, op. cit., footnote 27.
r19661 2 O.R. 63 (Ont. C.A.).
89 Fsneciallv relyine on Bernhard, supra, footnote 72.
90 The Nova Scotip Court of ADveal had aereed with this conclusion
in Pace. but drew a different inference about the Supreme Court reversal
of Laroche.
87
88
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the events which must occur, can be divided into three categories
-the conduct of the accused, the circumstances in which it takes
place, and the consequences to which it gives rise. We have already
talked about the nature of the mental element which relates to
the first two of these categories, the conscious voluntary character
of the conduct and the actual awareness or lack of mistake about
the existing relevant circumstances. What we are now to deal with
is the response of the Supreme Court to the third form of subjective excuse, that the consequences required for the offence were
the accidental products of the defendant's conduct.
A variety of mental attitudes towards the consequences might
possibly negative the defence of accident in our criminal law. A
person may want the consequences to come about and choose to
act for this purpose, either as his ultimate goal, as an intermediate means which is necessary to achieve it, or as an inevitable
concomitant of the successful accomplishment of his ends. In the
literature any one of these attitudes would be termed "intention",
on the assumption that each is equally blameworthy. If the consequence is not intended in any one of these senses, its occurrence
is accidental. However, accidents may be produced as a result of
the unreasonable and careless behaviour of the defendant, conduct creating an undue risk of this harm. If so, the accident can
be said to result from his negligence.
Two further distinctions are possible between different forms of
accident. The person may or may not have thought about the
substantial possibility of the risk occurring and have decided to
run the risk in any event for his own ends. Hence the negligence,
the production of the consequence, may be advertent or inadvertent. The former kind of carelessness is conventionally called
recklessness." Another and different line may be drawn across
this subdivision though, based on the seriousness of the risk.
The circumstances as perceivable by the actor may indicate a very
great or lesser likelihood that more or less serious harm will
materialize from his conduct. His failure to adopt appropriate precautions, whether advertent or inadvertent failure, can be described then as gross or slight negligence. Gross negligence may
also be called recklessness." Although these two distinctions are
logically quite different, it should be obvious as a practical matter
that the compelling character of the risk will be an important factor
in the fact-finder's inference about whether the actor consciously
perceived and then ignored it.
A very substantial debate has developed in the literature about
91 See, for example, Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (1965),
Ch. 1, and s. 2.02 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962).
" See, for example, Brett, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (1963), Ch. 4.
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when it is appropriate for the criminal law to punish defendants
whose conduct has produced prohibited but unintended and accidental consequences. It is fair to say that all of the participants
in this debate accept the legitimacy of extending the criminal
sanction from the area of intended effects to those which are produced by advertent negligence-recklessness in this sense. The
dispute is joined over the further question of whether it is appropriate also to sanction criminal conduct which inadvertently
produces harmful consequences, as a result of neglect in a seriously risky situation-what we might call gross inadvertent negligence, or recklessness in a second sense.
As far as the policy debate is concerned, what is important
is not the words that are used, but rather the underlying psychological states they are supposed to denote. It is easy to understand
how the overlapping categories of negligence, recklessness, gross
carelessness, and so on can lead to conceptual confusion. The
gravaman of the real debate, though, is the question of whether
criminal law should be used to stigmatize only conscious decisions
to produce a risk with harmful results,93 or should also be resorted
to as a means of deterring inattention which may be just as dangerous." I would suppose that even the adherents of the latter position would want to single out only those who are capable of
meeting the objective standards of care prescribed by the law and
would find offensive any strict liability for the few who are
abnormally incapable of doing better." Assuming that distinction,
though, the question still remains as to how attenuated the concept
of fault or mens rea should be made as it is extended into the
area of inadvertent accidents.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the distinctions and possibilities are numerous and complex here. I have merely indicated
the nature of the main dispute without canvassing the extensive
arguments that are made on both sides. The question is similar in
principle to one I spoke of earlier, whether an unreasonable mistake about existing circumstances is an acceptable alternative to
both mens rea or strict liability. Unlike the latter, the problem
of fault in accidents has come up consistently before the Supreme
Court, in a family of related cases involving driving offences.
The opinions in these cases indicate a total lack of appreciation of
the distinctions and arguments I have talked about. Perhaps it is
most charitable to assume that the court was confused by the context in which the problem arose, the constitutional division of
" See Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded From Penal
Liability (1963), 63 Col. L. Rev. 632.
* See Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,
(1937), 37 Col. L. Rev. 701.
" See Hart. Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility in op.
cit., footnote 38, p. 136.

326

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL. XLIX

authority in respect of penalizing the conduct of negligent drivers.
96
The first case, O'Grady v. Sparling
involved the question of
whether the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act validly made careless
driving a provincial offence, in the face of the Code prohibition
of criminal negligence in driving. The Supreme Court -in this case,
and in R. v. Stephens" held that the provincial offence was constitutionally valid.
There were two issues in the case. First, did the provinces have
the right to create such legislation at all, in the face of the constitutional allocation of exclusive legislative competence in the field
of "criminal law" to the federal Parliament? Here the majority
judgment of Judson J." held the provinces did have this right,
for purposes of regulating provincial highways. The dissenting
judgment of Cartwright J." disagreed, saying that punishment of
careless driving was the exercise of the criminal law power. The
next question was whether the actual exercise of the federal criminal law power to create the offence of criminal negligence on the
road rendered the prima facie valid provincial legislation inoperative or whether they could each live concurrently. The same
division of opinion continued to uphold the present validity of the
provincial statute. It is in this second context that our own problem came to the fore as the judges attempted to discern the meanings and relative compatibility of these two provisions.
In this regard, what is of interest is that both opinions,
concurred in by all the nine judges on the court, agreed that
criminal negligence meant advertent negligence. Both Judson and
Cartwright JJ. refer to Williams and Turner's edition of Kenny...
for the conceptual distinctions I referred to earlier. Criminal negligence, defined by the Code as the wanton and reckless disregard
of the lives and safety of other persons, is now stated to mean
advertent attention to these consequences. Cartwright J. agrees
with Judson J. that this equation of criminal negligence under the
Code with recklessness as thus defined makes it quite different from
the inadvertent negligence which is sufficient for careless driving.
The latter argues though that a decision by Parliament to punish
only advertent negligence on the highway carries with it the negative implication that inadvertent negligence should not be punished. His theories of constitutional concurrency did not carry
the day.
Of importance here is the almost inadvertent character of the
" Supra, footnote 10.

97 [1960] S.C.R. 823. The line-up in this case was exactly the same as
in the earlier decision.
" Kerwin C.J., Taschereau, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland and Ritchie JJ.
agreed.
9Locke J. concurring.
10Op. cit., footnote 27.
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policy decision which had been made about the basis of criminal
liability for negligence. Because the court's attention is focused
on the constitutionality of provincial legislation, it does not really
see the policy implications for the criminal law of its interpretation of the "criminal negligence" section, one which applies to
many other offences besides driving an automobile. In particular,
it did not advert at all to the historical debate between common law
judges and academics about the proper reach of criminal punishment. I believe the court is right in deciding that "recklessness"
requires advertent foresight of consequences but it is not a sufficient reason for this conclusion that two English text writers
have reached this conclusion about their own common law, and
even then with some necessary qualification. What the court should
have done was to relate this conclusion to the basic policies of
blameworthiness in the criminal law which limit punishment to
those who voluntarily choose to break the criminal law and risk
the creation of prohibited harms. If the court had seized this
opportunity to think about a general principle or presumption
concerning the minimum kind of culpability which should normally be necessary for criminal guilt, it might have avoided the
tortuous rationalizations in the rest of this sequence of decisions.''
At the time of O'Grady v. Sparling, the only existing federal
legislation was that relating to criminal negligence. In 1961,
though, there was enacted into the Code a prohibition of driving
"in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to
all the circumstances"."' Of course, this would raise anew the
issue of the continued viability of provincial careless driving legislation which had only been held valid vis- -vis "criminal negligence". The question reached the court in Mann V. The Queen,'
where a High Court judge had held the careless driving section
inoperative in the face of the "dangerous driving" provision,
because both penalized the same conduct and each was satisfied
with only inadvertence as to this conduct. The Supreme Court
upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had reversed Mr.
Justice Haines, and sustained the continued operation of "careless driving".
Cartwright J. wrote the most comprehensive decision, however
defective it was. He indicated his respect for precedent by conceding the questions of provincial power he had unsuccessfully advanced in O'Grady. The question that remained, though, was
'o' It might also have prevented the difficult to justify decision in R. v.
Rogers (1968), 4 C.C.C. 278. Apparently the Supreme Court refused leave
to appeal from this case which limited its subjective interpretation of
criminal negligence.
'S. 221(4).
"" Supra, footnote 53. The same issue was also disposed of by the same
court in R. v. McIver [1966] S.C.R. 256.
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whether there were sufficient differences between federal and
provincial provisions that the latter retain independent validity.
Cartwright J. was able to answer in the affirmative because he felt
that "dangerous driving" required advertent disregard of the consequences, and not simply the inadvertent negligence of careless
driving.
How did he arrive at this conclusion? Of course, he did not
address himself to the desirability of one interpretation rather
than another in the light of the established objectives of the
criminal law. Instead he referred to an earlier decision of the
Quebec Court of Appeal,'" where Casey J. had interpreted an
earlier version of the dangerous driving section as requiring a
"moral element" not necessary for ordinary negligence, to wit
"knowledge or wilful disregard of the consequences". According to
Cartwright J., Parliament must have been aware of this interpretation and intended to adopt it when they re-enacted the provision. He recognized that the earlier statute, which had been repealed, had contained the word "recklessly" which was not in the
new or otherwise identical section. However, he did not find
significant the omission of this very word "reckless" whose definition by Williams and Kennyo' he had read into the "criminal
negligence" section. Nor did he advert to the problem of why
Parliament would want to enact a new statutory crime which was
identical to one that had very recently been interpreted authoritatively by the Supreme Court itself.
Fauteux J.'" just asserted that the "dangerous driving" and
"careless driving" provisions differed in subject-matter, legislative
purpose, and legal and practical effect, and thus both could operate concurrently. Spence J., while agreeing with Cartwright J.,
seemed to find another kind of difference, in the kinds of conduct
which satisfy both sections. Danger to other persons is not a
necessary ingredient of careless driving, which may be satisfied by
inconvenience to, or obstruction of, others. Ritchie J."o' Simply

stated that the sections dealt with different subject matters, since
"careless driving" would cast a wider net over conduct than would
"dangerous driving". He said that Parliament by section 221 (4)
has not created a crime of inadvertent negligence. He did not say
that Parliament intended to create a crime of advertent negligence.
Judson J. in the final analysis, ended up by concurring with all
of these varied and contrasting positions, except that of Spence J.
The effort up to now had been to save provincial legislation,
perhaps a commendable objective in the Canada of the Sixties.
1

0 R. v. Loiselle (1953), 17 C.R. 323 (Que. C.A.).
1e Op. cit., footnote 27.
'0 Abbott and Judson JJ. concurring.
107 Martland and Judson JJ. concurring.
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The fall-out created in the process, though, would require further
effort to make sense of the operation of the three sections, especially "dangerous driving". When persons were charged under the
latter section, it would no longer be sufficient to speculate about
differences between it and the "careless driving" clause. Differences
there had to be because of Mann, but some specific standard had
to be articulated giving precise meaning to the term "dangerous
driving". Perhaps the most intensive effort was that of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in R. v. Binus.'" There the court held that
criminal negligence and dangerous driving were distinguished as
advertence and inadvertence, while dangerous driving and careless driving, both involving inadvertence, were distinguished by the
nature of the consequences themselves. Dangerous driving actually
creates a danger to the lives or safety of the public (though not
necessarily results in harm) while careless driving may be such
without any risk of harm. Either one may be satisfied by inadvertent deviation from reasonable care, whether very considerable
or slight.
When the case reached the Supreme Court,"o' the conviction
was unanimously confirmed, but not this reasoning. Two judges did
agree with Mr. Justice Laskin's Appeal Court judgment, Judson
J."' holding that the inadvertent failure to exercise reasonable
care is sufficient if it is in fact dangerous to the public. Cartwright J."' in a two-page judgment, rejected the arguments in
Laskin J.'s page opinion. He agreed that the Laskin and Judson
JJ.'s position was most persuasive on the merits. However, he
felt constrained to follow the binding precedent of Mann,"' where,
or so he found, five of the seven judges had held advertent negligence necessary for "dangerous driving". Such remarks were
not obiter in that case and hence had to be followed, in the absence
of compelling reasons not to do so. Because he felt the charge
sufficient in any case, he upheld the conviction.
Neither of Cartwright J.'s propositions appears to stand close
analysis. As far as the merits are concerned, the Laskin-Judson
JJ. proposal has very little to offer. It must be remembered that
the federal government was enacting criminal legislation as part
of the Criminal Code. Interpreting what it has done and implementing its will requires that the court look at its product
from this point of view, no matter what difficulties it may have
created for itself in its constitutional efforts. In this regard, the
first question is whether there should be a strong presumption in
favour of advertence-of conscious decision to run the risk-as
108

[1966] 4 C.C.C. 193 (Ont. C.A.).

" Supra, footnote 11.
110 Taschereau C.J. agreeing.
n1 Ritchie and Spence JJ. concurring.
112 Supra, footnote 53.
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a condition of criminal blame. In the light of the answer to this,
the second question is whether Parliament has made a sufficiently
clear statement of its will to the contrary.
If we think that "dangerous driving", read in conjunction with
"criminal negligence", must be interpreted as involving only
"inadvertent negligence", then the Laskin-Judson JJ. version of
the latter just does not make sense, within the perspective of the
criminal law. After all, we are trying to influence conduct-human
behaviour-and our definitions must then refer to the situation
from the point of view of the actors at the time this conduct occurs.
The question as to danger, then, must not be whether it in fact
existed, but rather whether the actor did or should have realized
it existed while he was driving, and thus should have taken steps
to have avoided it. Of course, Haines J.'s earlier judgment in
Mann is then correct, that (except perhaps for some rare and
trivial instances), the same question is raised for careless driving.
It is because the driver should perceive danger in a situation that
his failure to adopt appropriate precautions is "careless".
This does not mean that no rational distinction can be drawn
between "dangerous" and "careless" driving. All that is necessary
is that we drop the corollary to the Laskin-Judson JJ. opinion,
that any deviation, whether slight or considerable, from the standard of reasonable care is sufficient for both offences. Obviously
there are real differences in the kinds of harm which can be
caused, the imminence of the risks being realized, and the indifference to the precautions which are available. We already make
much the same kind of distinction in tort law between "gross" or
excessive negligence and the "ordinary" variety. Surely this is a
more rational distinction between "dangerous" and "careless"
driving than the one that all judges in the case find "most persuasive".
I do not contend that this is the meaning of the distinction
which the federal legislature "intended" in passing section 221(4).
The word "dangerous" is not self-defining and a perusal of the
legislative history in Hansardshows they were not quite sure what
they intended but, at least, that they did not think about this
point. However, the court's constitutional decision in O'Grady
and Mann set an authoritative framework in which the court had
to work out a rational adjustment between the three offences. If
one considers the point of the whole definitional exercise-the
imposition of different grades of penalty, some of which carry the
stigma of the Criminal Code-this kind of differentiation at least
makes sense and is not incompatible with the evidence we have
of the legislative will."'
u' See Hoover, Dangerous Driving: A Controversial Decision (1966),
9 Crim. L.Q. 37.
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But of course Cartwright J.'s majority judgment did not accept
the Laskin-Judson JJ. approach. Although it would have liked to
do so, the constraints of stare decisis precluded this. Was the court
really bound by this precedent in the way Cartwright J. suggested,
because this is what five of the seven judges said? If we reread
Mann, though, we find that only Cartwright J. explicitly said that
advertent negligence was required for "dangerous driving". Spence
J., who agrees with him here, suggested quite a different distinction in Mann, in fact one that was a precursor to the LaskinJudson JJ. approach. Ritchie J.'s judgment is totally ambiguous,
although he now also agrees with Cartwright J. It is hard to find
the two dissenters, since the last position, that of Fauteux J., was
the opinion of three judges (Abbott and Judson JJ. also). Perhaps
Cartwright J. wished to include Judson J. among the five who
agreed with him, since Judson J. said he did. Yet Judson J. now
says he does not and writes an opinion adopting what was, in
effect, the Spence J. position in Mann, the only one he did not
agree with in Mann. One might conclude by saying that this is a
rather tortuous way to find a precedent which obligates a majority
to reach a conclusion which it feels unpersuasive on the merits.
Yet, perhaps this is all legalistic irrelevancy. The court has
required, in a rather roundabout way, that criminal prosecution
under the Code for improper driving requires proof of a conscious,
fully voluntary effort. Good arguments can be made (although
they were not made) that this is a thoroughly desirable restriction
on the imposition of the stigma and condemnation inherent in
criminal punishment. Perhaps, though, the inadequacy of the means
utilized to reach a defensible result can return to haunt the court.
Since my writing this article the court has decided the case of
R. v. Peda," a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal convicting the defendant of "dangerous driving" over the dissents of
Laskin J.A., in the Court of Appeal and Cartwright J. in the Supreme Court. The essence of the dispute on appeal concerned
the trial judgment's direction which simply read and then paraphrased the statutory definition of the crime. Laskin J.A. and
Cartwright J. held that some explicit reference to the "advertent"
character of the offence was necessary. The majority in each court
disagreed.
As was stated earlier, Laskin J.A. had written the opinion in
Binus which held that dangerous driving could be committed "inadvertently". Naturally enough, he read the Supreme Court's
Binus opinion and decided that his earlier view of the law was
rendered invalid. Amazingly enough, every judge on the Supreme
n [1969] S.C.R. 905. Since writing this, an extensive treatment of this
whole sequence has appeared. See Bums, An Aspect of Criminal Negligence (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 47.
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Court, including Cartwright J. did not agree that Binus had that
effect. The court did not purport to over-rule Binus (although,
parenthetically, some judges felt they had the power to do so),
because none of the judges felt that Cartwright J.'s earlier statements were a binding authority. Notwithstanding the majority
status of his opinion, the fact that he eventually upheld the conviction made all statements in favour of the defendant obiter,
because they were not necessary steps on the way to the actual
decision.
Such a theory of stare decisis, and the ratio decidendi of a
case is ingenuous to say the least. When the highest appellate
court is faced with a general legal question, one which has been
raised in great depth both in argument and in the lower court
decision, and then speaks very clearly to this legal question, it just
does not make sense to say that its opinion is not an authoritative
precedent. Surely it is irrelevant that, after making its decision
on the legal question, the opinion goes on to hold that this rule
does not apply for the benefit of the party which had contended
for the rule itself. On this court's theory, the statements in Hedley
Byrne,"' for instance, about duty of care with regard to negligent
misrepresentation are merely obiter because the House of Lords
later found the duty did not obtain in the concrete situation.
The fallacy in the court's position lies in its failure to consider
the reasons for stare decisis itself in determining what statements in
an opinion are its authoritative and binding ratio. Surely the
demands of predictability, objectivity and fairness in legal reasoning require that Cartwright J.'s remarks in Binus be given the same
status no matter how he evaluated the particular facts of the case.
Of course, I do not doubt that the court should be able to overrule its earlier decisions in certain cases, perhaps including this
one. If it does, though, it should be aware of the significance
of this step.
What did the court decide about the proper definition of
"dangerous driving"? Cartwright J.,"' while agreeing that Binus
was not binding, stuck to his curious theory that "advertent negligence" was required by O'Grady and Mann, because the court had
held there that "inadvertent negligence" was not sufficient. The
majority opinion of Judson J."' agreed that the section did not
create a crime of "inadvertent negligence", (because of Mann).
However, he thought that the section itself was crystal-clear in
meaning; the jury instruction was perfectly adequate in simply
repeating it. Presumably he means to incorporate by reference
the interpretation suggested by Laskin J.A. in Binus and accepted
11 [1964] A.C. 465. The famous House of Lords decision regarding
negligent misrepresentation.
116 Hall and Spence JJ. concurring.
17 Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, and Ritchie JJ. concurring.
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then by Judson J. Whatever else might be said about the merits
of this theory, it is fair to say that the section does not immediately, lucidly, and explicitly express it to a jury without elaboration.
The final opinion of Pigeon J. is even stranger, and the oddest
fact is that Ritchie J. also joins in this opinion as well as that of
Judson J. Pigeon J. construes Mann as having held that dangerous
driving requires mens rea because it is a criminal offence and thus
is different from a regulatory or statutory offence. Earlier he had
agreed that mens rea consists of either intention or recklessness.
Pigeon J. then says that "dangerous driving" cannot be committed
by inadvertence, and thus agrees with the minority on this point.
However, he holds that the jury instruction must refer to mens rea
only if the evidence might support a relevant finding. Since he did
not feel this was possible here, he upheld the conviction.
The oddity of Ritchie J.'s behaviour, and the importance of
it, thus becomes apparent. Four judges-Cartwright, Spence, Hall,
and Pigeon JJ.-clearly think dangerous driving is a mens rea
criminal offence. From this opinion, as well as in Binus, Judson
J. does not agree, and the same appears true of Fauteux, Abbott
and Martland JJ. Ritchie J. appears to agree with both Judson
and Pigeon JJ., whereas in Binus he agreed with Cartwright J.
How lower courts will react to this situation is purely speculative.
If we retreat to behaviouralism, it does appear that they can hardly
go wrong if they uphold all provincial statutes and convict all
defendants. At least it appears that a consistent thread in the
Supreme Court decisions has been their concern to put no roadblocks in the way of control of driving behaviour. That this involves the risks of real injustice to individual defendants who
can be charged with two different offences for the same conduct,
and thus are subjected to coercive plea bargaining and irrational
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, does not appear as yet to be
of great concern to the Supreme Court.
Presumed and Constructive Intent.
Up to now, the facet of mens rea which involves intention of,
or advertence to, the consequences has been considered in the
context of cases where the consequences did not occur. The
driving offences we have been talking about penalized conduct
which (knowingly or unknowingly) created the risk of certain
harms resulting. The cases with which this section is concerned
dealt with situations where the harm did result-the consequence
of death-and the question is whether the defendant should be
held responsible for it. The assumption in each is that the statute
does not permit strict liability and some form of mens rea is
required. The issues raised concern the existence of presumptions or other special rules for imputing the required mens rea
D.
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to the defendant, such special doctrines being especially prevalent
in the criminal law of murder.
What makes this area of our concern so noteworthy is the
presence of the greatly discussed and heavily criticized House of
Lords decision in D.P.P. v. Smith."' This case held that, in the
English law of capital murder, the defendant's guilt was satisfied
by conduct on his part causing death where a reasonable man
would foresee it causing grievous bodily harm. In effect, murder
can be committed by a stupid person's inadvertent negligence."'
Now, as was said earlier, we must make inferences about intent or
advertence from conduct, as well as from credible statements of
the actor on the stand. The question is whether such conduct
should create a presumption, rebuttable or irrebutable, of the
existence of the necessary mental state? Should the trier of fact
be forced to decide simply on the basis of the objective character
of the conduct or should he be allowed to believe or disbelieve
verbal protestations about the accused's intent?
The question arises in two separate contexts in Canadian law.
The first is the review of jury charges concerning factual inferences of intent and how far it is proper to speak of presumptions
here. The second is the interpretation and elaboration of the
Canadian law of constructive murder, committed in the course
of certain named offences. Conceptually the two are distinguishable. The first speaks in terms of presuming or imputing an
actual intent while the second imputes legal responsibility for the
consequences without regard to whether there was any mens rea
at all. However, if the doctrines of presumption are extended as
far as they are in Smith, then, as a practical matter there is no
real.difference in their operation.
The effect of the Supreme Court's conception of its role-its
default on the job of being a supreme appellate court of Canadian
criminal law-is amply illustrated here. An early case, Wu v. The
King"' did use the language of presumption of intention of the
natural consequences of one's acts. The main modern case, Bradley,"' directly and explicitly poses the issue, but the court never
"s Supra, footnote 44.
". The House of Lords did impose some curiously illogical, though
pragmatically understandable, limitations on the reach of this presumption.
Actual knowledge of the existing situation is necessary as well as some
kind of unlawful act directed at the victim, conditions which seemed designed to protect the negligent driver from the risk of a murder conviction.
`o [19341 S.C.R. 609.
121 [19561 S.C.R. 723.
The court's performance in this case is typical of its customary work.
Bradley involved a death arising out of a drunken fist fight in an alley on a
very cold night. The accused apparently knocked the deceased down, kicked
him in the head, gagged him with his own belt, took away his coat, and
left him alive but unconscious. Death arose from all of the injuries and exposure after drinking. There was evidence of a skull fracture but none that
the accused was aware of this. The trial judge spoke of the presumption of
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seems to consider it a significant legal problem, and does not
mention Wu, or, indeed, any relevant precedent. Finally, as was
stated earlier, Ritchie J. in King, in an obiter discussion of the
effect of impairment from the voluntary consumption of alcohol,
did speak of the objective character of mens rea with reference
to mistake. Not only did he not mention Smith,"' the very recent
English cause cdl~bre, but he did not perceive the relevance of
Bradley or O'Grady, which went in the opposite direction in
defining mens rea with reference to accident."'
The second doctrine in this area, normally called "constructive
murder", involves the interpretation of the Code's provisions
which incorporate and define the common law of murder during
the commission of offences. Using a wide variety of mental states,
the Code enunciates different kinds of conduct which will lead
to a conviction of capital murder if death results from the accused's committing one of a series of indicated offences. The
typical case in which death results involves the commission of
robbery, and this gave rise to four Supreme Court cases in this
area.
the natural consequences of one's acts and the accused was convicted. This
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court of Canada,
the latter by a majority of four to three.
All of the judgments treated the case as involving only narrow factual
issues of the proper interpretation of the evidence and the compatibility
of the jury charge with the evidence. The tacit assumption of all appears
to be that speaking of a presumption of intent is incorrect if it purports to
be any more than an aid in discovering the actual intent of the accused.
(This is the interpretation of this case by Beck and Parker, The Intoxicated
Offender-A Problem of Responsibility (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 563, at
p. 605 et seq., and Ryan, The Objective Test of Criminal Liability (196061), 3 Crim. L.Q. 305, at p. 320 et seq.). No reasons are given in favour
of this conclusion, no cases are cited in support of it, and no clear statement is made about it. All the discussion is directed to the question of
whether, notwithstanding the erroneous charge, any substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice occurred.
As regards this focus of the case, what is important for our purposes
is that the lineup of judges on this narrow issue of judgment aptly reflects
our general attitudinal conclusions. Fauteux J. writes one majority opinion,
Locke J. another and narrower one for the same conclusion. Cartwright,
Rand and Nolan JJ. each wrote opinions, all making the same points, that
knowledge of the skull fracture was critical and had to be brought home
to the accused. The jury's function of deciding this was usurped by the
trial judge and by the court majority here.
..Supra, footnote 44.
123 The real maker of Canadian law in this area has been the Ontario
Court of Appeal. In R. v. Gianotti (1956), 23 C.R. 259, it held that there
was no presumption of law that a person intends the natural consequences
of his lethal acts. This case, which deals with the authorities and issues, was
followed in later cases, in Ontario (R. v.. Ortt, [1969] 1 O.R. 461) and
British Columbia (R. v. Carter (1966), 56 W.W.R. 65). In fact, in the
final case (Ortt), the court went farther to disapprove of all language of
presumotion here, even factual, because of the suggestion of an onus on the
accused. With eminent good sense, it told trial judges to speak to judges
in terms of "reasonable inferences" about intention from "natural consequences of acts". It is to be hoped that this attitude will also be reflected
in the Supreme Court.
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Although none of the cases advert to this kind of argument
it is pertinent to inquire what purpose might motivate legislative
creation of constructive murder. After all, if a person is committing
an offence (or attempting to do so), he will be subject to some
punishment. The imposition of a further capital penalty for accidental death which results may reflect legislative condemnation
of particularly wicked conduct or the desire for vengeance on behalf of the deceased. More charitably, it evidences great concern
for deterrence of peculiarly dangerous methods of committing
offences, especially the use of guns or stopping the victim's
"

breath.

The first case, decided by the pre-1949 court, King v.
Hughes' reversed unanimously a conviction of capital murder
where a gun was discharged accidentally in a struggle with the
storeowner during a robbery. The lack of a voluntary act in
discharging the pistol precluded a murder conviction following
inevitably. As a result of this case, the federal Parliament enacted
(the present) section 202(d) which the court in Rowe v. The
King"' interpreted as involving strict liability for death occurring
because of the use of a gun in a robbery.
Of interest in the second case is the apparent reversal of attitude to the extension of constructive murder. Only Cartwright J.,
in dissent, holds that the general principle of mens rea in murder
should be considered over-ruled by Parliament, only when and so
far as appears clearly necessary from its language. All the others,
in judgments written by Kerwin"7 and Kellock JJ., hold that
"flight" includes a situation over one hundred miles from the
robbery while no pursuit at all was in progress. Rinfret, Kerwin
and Taschereau JJ. had concurred in the narrower interpretation
of the section in Hughes. I do not deny that their view of "flight"
as involving simply the subjective appreciation of the accused is a
viable reading of the language. It is obvious, though, that this is
not inevitable and nowhere do they attempt to meet Cartwright
J.'s mention of principle with anything more than dictionaries,
certainly not with any practical arguments.
The final two cases in this sequence, Cathro v. The Queen"'
and Chow Bew v. The Queen"' again come down to a difference
about the evidence and the significance of the trial judge's charge
to the jury. All of the judges appeared to agree about the general
" See discussion in Edwards, Constructive Murder in Canadian and
English Law (1960-61), 3 Crim. L.Q. 481, at p. 506.
"- [1942] S.C.R. 517.
126 [1951] S.C.R. 713. There is a very good comment on this case and
its background by Willes, Comment (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 784.
127 Rinfret C.J., Taschereau, Estey, and Fauteux JJ. concurring.
8 [1956] S.C.R. 101.
12o [1956] S.C.R. 124. See discussion of these
cases in Ryan, op. cit.,
footnote 1, at pp. 82-84.
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issues of law, the relationship of the constructive murder sections
to the provisions defining parties to such an offence. The question
which divided the court was again the narrow question of how
this general set of doctrines should be applied to the facts of one
case.130
E.

CapitalMurder-"Plannedand Deliberate".
The problems presented by these cases are exactly the opposite of those raised in the earlier section. Instead of dealing with
doctrines which weaken the protection afforded by the normal
requirements of mens rea, the court here was forced to deal with
statutory language intended to add a further degree of blameworthiness to the elements of the offence. Section 202A was enacted in 1961 to formulate a distinction between capital and noncapital murder, the point of the distinction being to indicate which
homicides were or were not to be subject to capital punishment"o Both defendants participated in the same robbery in which the store
owner was killed. However, each was tried separately and the relevant evidence which became part of the record was different. Each was convicted
at trial, the convictions were both upheld by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, but the Supreme Court reversed Cathro's conviction while upholding Chow Bew's verdict. Cartwright J. was in favour of reversal in both
cases, Fauteux, Taschereau and Locke JJ., approved the conviction. The
swing votes were Rand and Kerwin JJ., while Estey J. who joined in the
majority in Cathro, was ill by the time Chow Bew was decided.
The pattern of law which emerged from the cases is a relatively clear
resolution of some difficult problems of integrating different sections.
Section 202 (then s. 260) dealt with the responsibility of either of the
accused on the assumption that either committed the killing himself. Death
was as a result of strangulation and liability would then be based on negligence about grievous bodily harm. The defence of both, though, was that
the other caused the death and thus each could be guilty of constructive
murder only if section 21 (then s. 69) came into play so as to impute
responsibility to him for the consequences of this conduct. The dissenting
opinion in Cathro, by Fauteux and Taschereau JJ. was willing to find him,
on his own evidence, a party under section 21 because of his actual participation in the conduct which caused death. The majority held that this
was factually ambiguous and the jury should have been more adequately
instructed about liability merely from participation in a robbery.
In Chow Bew there was no evidence at all about what went on during
the same robbery, although evidence harmful to the accused had already
been considered in Cathro. Rand and Kerwin JJ. apparently changed their
minds about the necessity of instructions detailing the different results
which would flow from different ways in which the robbery might have
occurred. They were unwilling to give Chow Bew the right to have a jury
decide whether Cathro committed the murder in the way Cathro had attributed to Chow Bew in his own trial. Cartwright J. said that, notwithstanding the lack of evidence, this question should be put to the jury. How
much this kind of disagreement about the judge's role reflects differences in
attitudes about mens rea and constructive murder is moot. The division
does occur along the behavioural indications of attitude, though, including,
especially, the voting pattern in Rowe. Moreover, it is obvious that greater
concern for the jury's role, and relative non-use of the "substantial wrong
or miscarriage of justice" test for asses~ing charges to the jury, would be
favourable to the accu,ed on appeal even though the desirability and importance at trial of precisely correct trial charges may be very debatable.
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hanging. Assuming that culpable homicide is murder, whether intended under section 201, or constructively under section 202, it
becomes capital if the jury also finds that it was "planned and
deliberate" (or falls into two other categories irrelevant for our
purposes). Of course, this legislative language, although indicating
to some extent Parliament's will, is not automatically self-defining
for all purposes. In its short-lived span of six years (capital
murder was further narrowed in 1967 by dropping these kinds of
homicide), the Supreme Court was faced with several problems
to which the language spoke only obliquely.
The first, and most interesting, of these cases was More v.
The Queen,"' where the court reversed a Manitoba Court of
Appeal judgment that had upheld the conviction of the accused
for capital murder. The accused had murdered his wife and unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide, all because he thought
she would be unhappy when she learned of his financial difficulties.
There was substantial evidence of planning of the murder, of steps
taken over a period of several days leading up to its commission,
and then further steps taken after it and before the suicide attempt.
The defendant claimed, though, that the trial judge had inadequately instructed the jury about evidence of psychiatrists that he
was suffering from a depressive psychosis resulting in an impairment of his ability to reach decisions. He disclaimed any defence
of insanity and asked that this evidence be related only to the
question of capital murder.
Cartwright J., in a short two-page judgmentl 3' said that "deliberate" adds something to the requirement of "intention: and
that this medical evidence is relevant to the question. Though
this testimony would not satisfy the 'insanity' requirements of
section 16, the latter is relevant only to the question of intention
and murder, not deliberateness and capital murder". He added that
he wished these remarks confined to the specific facts of this case.
Judson J., whose opinion only discussed the evidence, agreed with
Cartwright J. about the law.
Fauteux J.'s opinion" seems almost directed to another case,
because he finds a debatable and intellectually challenging problem, one worthy of more than just a conclusion. In trying to give
meaning to the word "deliberate" he looked at both English and
French dictionaries and reached the conclusion that some reference to a time element was intended. He concludes that Parliament
wished to exclude all impulsive murders from the capital category.
However, a murder may be planned, and not impulsive, notwithstanding the fact that it is irrationally motivated as the result of
Supra, footnote 9.
a Abbott, Judson, Ritchie, and Hall JJ. concurring.
" Taschereau CJ. agreeing.
"'
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the accused's irresponsibility and mental impairment. To make the
latter factors relevant, in this mitigated way, is to introduce a form
of diminished responsibility, analogous to the recent English
experiment. However, the Canadian Parliament, which must have
been aware of the latter, did not choose to do this explicitly. It
should not be presumed that Parliament would change fundamental rules of criminal responsibility and insanity unless this is
clearly expressed, and he cites an American text... to show that
this result is inconsistent with general principles.
It seems clearly true to me that Fauteux J. is right about the
significance of the innovation the majority are making in this case.
Surely if a person was perfectly sane, and planned to kill someone
and make elaborate preparations and took steps over an extended
period of time, he could not claim exemption here because he
finally committed himself only at the last minute. Yet this appears
to be the kind of use to which the majority wishes this evidence
put, as Cartwright J.'s cautionary remarks indicate. This is unfortunate, because Fauteux J.'s position, however more sophisticated than the others, is not free from difficulties.
As is typical of his opinions, Fauteux J.'s very intelligent
arguments are within a very narrow compass, flowing from its
origin in a dictionary. He does not advert to the whole point of the
legislative exercise, to single out a category of offenders for whom
this harshest of penalties is to be reserved. When we look at the
question from this perspective, what is wrong with the conclusion
that a person whose responsibility is impaired should not be included in this category? The phrase "planned and deliberate"
indicates the legislative judgment that rational and cold-blooded
murders, which usually are for gain, require this extra deterrence.
It is true that it thus excludes the less rational, impulsive, situational kind of homicide but should not this same objective require
exclusion of those who murder as a result of impairment of their
reasoning faculties? The language Parliament used does not seem
to preclude it."*
1
Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defence (1954). He did
not advert, though, to the analogous California developments in People V.
Wells (1949), 20 P.2d 53 and People v. Gorshen (1959), 336 P.2d 492.
'3 A year later, a somewhat similar case arose in McMartin v. The
Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 484, where the evidence was supposed to show that
the accused might act impulsively, unpredictably, dangerously, and without provocation. All of the judges agree with Ritchie J., including Fauteux
J., and Taschereau J., that the evidence is admissible for the capital murder
issue, simply citing a passage from Cartwright J. in More as an authority.
When a question appears clearly decided, an earlier dissenter will accept
the precedent rather than adhere to his former position. Of greater interest,
though, are Cartwright J.'s own doubts about the nature and strength of the
More precedent, doubts which he expressed in The Queen v. Mitchell,
[1964] S.C.R. 471.
Here the accused had won an appeal in the British Columbia Court of
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Drunkenness and Criminal Guilt.
The case of R. v. George'" is the leading Canadian authority
in the very complex and difficult area of intoxication and the
criminal offender. It illustrates quite clearly the typical, even exclusive mode of reasoning adopted in our Supreme Court. Consideration of its impact and subsequent treatment in our lower
courts of appeal amply demonstrates the deficiencies of such a
process of decision-making, either in establishing authoritative legal
rules for the country or in imparting any trace of rational quality
and principle into the rules that flow from the institution.
George was accused of robbery and acquitted at trial because
the judge concluded that the evidence of his intoxicated state
created a reasonable doubt of his intention to steal money from
the victim of his violent blows. The Crown appealed on the basis
that common assault was an included offence and the trial judge
should have convicted George for this offence. At the Supreme
Court level this contention was upheld by a majority of four to
one. The dissenter, Locke J., did not address himself to the question of drunkenness and mens rea, since he felt the Crown should
not be able to raise the issue of included offences for the first time
at the appeal level.
The majority judgments of Fauteux'm and Ritchie JJ." both
start with the assumption that the House of Lords decision in
Beard"' is the locus classicus of our law. I do not deny that such
a conclusion is legally defensible but I would assert that it is not
inevitable. There is no statutory mention of drunkenness as a
defence under the Criminal Code and thus no statutory requirement of Beard. Section 7(2) of the Code speaks of the preservation of the common law defences but our Code was enacted long
Appeal on the grounds that the trial judge had not sufficiently directed the
jury on the independent significance of evidence of drunkenness and provocation to the question of capital murder. The majority judgment of Spence
J. (Taschereau C.J., Fauteux, Martland, and Ritchie JJ. concurring), extends
the logic of the More opinion to its widest reach, again its only reasons
being the short quotation from Cartwright J.'s opinion in More. While Fauteux J. continues to concur in the extension of the position he earlier disapproved of, Cartwright J., who originally proposed it, now has his doubts.
He said there were special facts in More, not present here, which likely
differentiated the two. However, he would not make a final decision about
this point because he was able also to uphold the appeal on a third evidentiary ground. Yet this is a rather strange attitude to take, since the
majority was deciding the general legal question even if he was not, and
their conclusions would prove binding in later cases even if he disagreed.
Cartwright J.'s decision to withhold the arguments he might make, though,
is something which is symptomatic of his conception of his role as adjudicator of specific disputes, rather than appellate court developer of
Canadian law.
"I Supra, footnote 13.
.'Taschereau J. concurring.
" Martland J. concurring.
19 [1920] A.C. 479.
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before Beard, and the drunkenness defence had undergone several
historical mutations up to then.'
There is no reason to suppose the process had to stop at
Beard for Canadian purposes, and there exists some decisional
authority for regarding a specific Canadian law as legitimate."' The
growth of the common law, both in Canada and England, in respect of the defence of automatism shows the capacity for judicial
development of the basic principles of the criminal law of excuses.
There was a good "legal" reason for treating this question
as closed in Canada, though, but this reason was not mentioned in
the George opinion. The Supreme Court of Canada had already,
in McAskill v. The King,"' decided that the Beard rules were the
Canadian law of drunkenness as a criminal defence. As is usual,
though, in George, the court treated its own precedents as irrelevant, while viewing the English case as something akin to Holy
Writ. If the latter is a little exaggerated, the analogy to a statutory
enactment is not. A passage from Beard is extracted, out of context, and treated as an exhaustive statement of the common law
defence, to be interpreted in accordance with the specific language
used. The court does not see its task as the analysis of this language within the context in which it was used, as a step in the
elaboration of a common law principle to be used in the solution
of a social problem, only one instance of which occurred in
Beard.
The significant issue raised by the language in Beard was the
distinction between general and specific intent. Does this distinction have any real content? If it does, should it be part of our
law?.'. The issue was clearly posed in the questions of law presented to the court, since the first asked whether evidence of
drunkenness "was relevant not only to the specific or special
intent" but also to "the ordinary mens rea which is a constituent
of all crimes". The response of the court was, to say the least,
ambiguous.
Both Fauteux and Ritchie JJ. cited Beard and made a distinction between intention in the sense of awareness or knowledge
of what was done and intention in the sense of the ulterior purpose
or objective for which conduct is undertaken. This could be said
to define the distinction between general and specific intent and
only the latter could be rebutted by evidence of intoxication. Yet,
after holding that only the second intent was excluded by the
judge's acquittal for robbery, both judges seemed to treat the
relevance of intoxication to the first kind of intent as a problematic
as regards the validity of the Beard statements about
1 Especially
proof.
...
As we shall see for both insanity and provocation.
`[1931] S.C.R. 330.
"' The best discussion is Beck and Parker, op. cit., footnote 121.
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issue of fact. Though Fauteux J. suggested it might be metaphysically impossible to be so drunk as not to know one is assaulting (applying force to) another, both held, as a matter of
fact, that there was such knowledge here despite the intoxication.
The conviction for assault followed only after this latter conclusion.
The ambiguity showed up in two subsequent lower court cases,
Vandervoort'" and Boucher."' The first difficulty stemmed from
the inadequacy of the analytical distinctions made in George. The
opinions in the latter contrasted awareness of our action or conduct (making it voluntary) and desire of or advertence to the
consequences which are the objective of our conduct (making it
intentional). As we have seen, though, there is the further issue
of the awareness of the circumstances which make conduct (or its
consequences) criminal, which may fail by reason of ignorance
or mistake. For instance, in the Rees situation, a person may have
intercourse with a girl who is in fact under the age of sixteen
and want to introduce evidence of his intoxication to support his
claim that he was unaware of this factual circumstance. Each of
these two provincial appellate cases raised the question of whether
drunkenness could be used to negate awareness of a girl's refusal
to consent to intercourse when the offender is charged with rape.
Boucher held that rape does not require a specific intent and
thus drunkenness is no defence. Vandervoort disagreed. Both
relied on Beard as interpreted by George.
However, this analytical inadequacy is not the major defect
of the court's effort in George, since they might well respond that
the distinction they made was sufficient for their own purposes.
What is objectionable and inexcusable is their total failure to
examine the reasons which justify the rule that is being adopted
on the face of the opinion. Though the court should not be required to formulate, once and for all, a complete pattern of doctrine for all the cases which might arise in this area, it should
indicate what it believes to be the underlying sense of the basic
assumptions it is adopting, so as to give some direction and guidance to the lower courts who will have to elaborate its efforts,
at least at first instance. Instead the court treats this as an area
where all the decisions have already been made in Beard, a conclusion it does not substantiate, and assumes that its task is
merely to follow these judgments which are already part of our
law.
How should a more adequate opinion have been written?
'- (1961),
14s (1962),
same court in
Saskatchewan
332.

130 C.C.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.).
39 C.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.). Boucher has been followed by this
R. v. Resener (1968), 4 C.C.C. 129 (B.C.C.A.) and by the
Court of Appeal in R. v. Hartridge (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d)
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The first question to be considered by the Supreme Court is
whether drunkenness, as such, should be a defence to criminal
conduct, either totally (as duress or insanity) or partially (as provocation). We know that the usual effect of the consumption
of alcohol is the breaking down of inhibitions and the lessening of
our control over our emotions and impulses. The result may well
be that we do things in our drunken condition which we would
not do if we were sober. The problem for the law is whether we
should punish the offender later, when he is sober, especially when
it is the first and probably last time when it will occur. Should
we excuse completely, or partially, or even require that the judges
take drunkenness into account as a mitigating factor in the
sentence?
Beard concluded that such a result was inconsistent with the
common law and should not be part of our legal system, and this
was concurred in by our court in MacAskill. Such a judgment is
rationally defensible, especially in the light of the intellectualistic
assumption of other criminal defences such as insanity which presume the deterrent effect of awareness of the criminal sanction
even in such a condition. However, Beard holds that drunkenness,
just as insanity, is an excuse when it is so advanced that it
excludes the possibility of knowledge, and thus of voluntary choice,
in the circumstances. When our court in George recognized that
drunkenness may be a defence by excluding intent, it should have
appealed to the reasons for requiring mens rea and shown how
drunkenness affected them. Of course, since we have seen that the
court does not give any reason for the requirement of mens rea
when it explicitly sets out to require it (in Beaver and O'Grady,
and their respective progeny), we can understand, if not excuse,
the omission in George.
If we try to repair this omission, the question arises why the
Boucher theory of the George defence is a rational one, a question I suggest is a relevant prerequisite to making the theory part
of our law. Do Boucher and Resener assume that ignorance
or mistake about the existence of consent is no defence to rape
even for the sober accused? Surely they would not when the very
existence or absence of consent is the critical factor in making
the conduct illicit.'" If this is a defence for a sober person,'
should it not also be a defence for one who is equally ignorant,
but due to his 'intoxication? Otherwise we clearly punish a person for a crime he at no time chose to commit, simply because
of his drunkenness. There are some cases where we admit the
impropriety of this course, those cases where there is a "specific
'" This would be totally inconsistent with the theory of Cartwright J. in
Rees.
"'See R. v. Okoye, [1964] Crim. L. Rev. 416.
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intent" (whatever this means outside of its historically anachronistic, procedural context). But all of the reasons which justify it
there require it also for "general intent" crimes."'
Hence the basic objection to Boucher is that it does not make
sense to acquit the person whose drunkenness prevents his choosing to commit theft, while convicting another whose drunkenness
prevented his choosing to commit assault or rape. Of course, all
of this assumes that we believe the accused's story on the facts
but it does not appear any more credible that the intent for theft
can be "metaphysically" excluded by drink while the intent for rape
or assault cannot be. Putting the question to the jury probably
allows the latter to apply a standard of "substantial impairment",
analogous to that used in insanity cases, which speak of "appreciation" and thus obtain much of what is sensible and desirable in
a defence of drunkenness per se.
Of course, none of this kind of analysis is manifested in any
of the opinions in this area. All of them follow the stylistic lead
of the court, though in a much more sophisticated way. What is
apparent, though, is that a failure to consider the wider implications of what one is doing-one's purposes and policies-may be
directly responsible for inadequate performance of a court's legal,
direction-giving functions.
G.

Provocation and Duress.
These two defences share certain important characteristics.
Unlike almost all of the other examples we have discussed, they
do not affect mens rea because of lack of knowledge or foresight
of some kind and, instead, focus directly on our powers of choice.
Duress, when it legally obtains, is held to vitiate completely any
meaningful ability to choose to obey the criminal law while provocation affects this same power sufficiently to reduce the degree
of offence for which one can be convicted. Second, each of these
defences is given a somewhat detailed definition in the Code which
thus may be taken to have frozen the process of common law development in fixed language whose limits the courts must respect.
Because our Code was originally drafted at a time when legal
appreciation of the significance of this kind of defence was substantially under-developed, the court's attitude towards its own
role becomes very important.
Not only was provocation defined by a statutory provision, but
the area was further structured by several Supreme Court precedents prior to this period as well as English decisions interpret4 It appears that Lord Birkenhead agreed with this reasoning in later
statements in his Beard opinion. If this is so, the logic of the argument
requires that drunkenness can also be used to negative the existence of the
mental element of "recklessness", for instance, in criminal negligence or
manslaughter cases; see R. v. Stones (1959) S.R. (N.S.W.) 25.
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ing the related common law rules. The critical problem which is
raised by the statutory section, considered by most of these decisions, and at the heart of academic criticism of its present scope,
is the threshold requirement that legal provocation must be such
as would deprive the "ordinary" or "reasonable" man of selfcontrol. English cases defining the ambit of the defence have
elaborated on this requirement and deemed irrelevant the accused's
mental deficiency,'' unusual pugnacity,' intoxicated state,"' or
a deformity such as sexual impotence."' For reasons to be mentioned later on, most commentators suggest that this tendency
misses the whole point of the defence.
Taylor"' was the chief decision in the area because it indicated
the distinctive character of the Canadian law, in the light of our
statute and the earlier Supreme Court cases. Kerwin J. traced the
common law antecedents and the legislative history of the section
(founded in Stephens' Draft Code) to show the innovative character of section 203, and especially the ability of a purely verbal
insult to amount to legal provocation. A second question was
raised about the relevance of drunkenness to either of the two
facets of the defence. Unfortunately, all the judges assumed it was
obvious that the "ordinary man" does not drink to the extent
that his self-control in the face of insults might be impaired. That
this is not obvious is amply indicated by the existence of some
authority for the proposition that drunkenness which causes an
49

' R. v. Lesbini, [1914] 3 K.B. 116.
'OR. v. Mancini, [1942] A.C. 1.
15'R. v. McCarthy, [1954] 2 All E.R. 262.
"'R. v. Bedder, [1954] 2 All E.R. 801.
"' [1947] S.C.R. Two early Supreme Court decisions set the stage for
its modern sequence. In Sampson, [1935] S.C.R. 634, the court, without
reasons, upheld a Nova Scotia decision which had advocated a totally objective approach to the defence. As a result, a forty-five-year-old coloured
man, with a mental age of twelve years, was convicted of murder for
killing two boys who threw stones at him and insulted him racially. However, Manchuk, [1938] S.C.R. 18, might have affected this logic for two
reasons. First, Duff J. explicitly adverted to the point of the provocation
defence. The latter neither justified nor excused a homicidal act but it did
render it less blameworthy because of the violent passions which prompted
the conduct. Because the offender was not considered in complete control,
he is to receive less than the automatic and extreme penalty for murder.
The fact that he was still to be convicted and punished for manslaughter,
though, should have led later courts to reconsider the application of too
ideal a standard of self-control in determining the beneficiaries of what is
only a mitigation of criminal sanction. The decision in Manchuk could
have been a fruitful precedent on its facts for a sensible interpretation of
the "ordinary man" threshhold. It appears that provocation by one person
would not be relevant to the killing of another: see R. v. Simpson (1915)
841 L.J.K.B. 1893 (C.C.A.); it is not obvious from the section or from
the policy which underlies it, why this must be so. However, a mistaken
belief in the latter's implication in the provocation would be sufficient. Nor
need this mistake be reasonable as long as it occurred in fact. Apparently
the "ordinary man" could make unreasonable mistakes about a situation
which provoked him to killing.
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unreasonable mistake is relevant to provocation."'
Taylor is important, though, for its holding that all subjective elements are relevant to the second question, whether the
provocation in fact caused loss of control. Kellock"' and Estey JJ.
show how the Beard limitation on the use of drunkenness does
not apply to this specific issue since that case dealt with the effect
on intention. Although provocation may affect fault or blameworthiness, in a wider sense, it does not exclude intention. Rather,
it assumes intention and prima facie guilt and thenshows how this
was created in a situation of passion induced by the wrongful
act of the accused."' It operates to mitigate guilt in a limited way,
in a specific context, by reducing murder to manslaughter. Curiously, Kerwin J."'whose opinion is so adequate on the first problem of the nature of "wrongful act or insult", is unresponsive
to the Estey analysis about drunkenness.
The three cases in the present period did raise some sigificant legal questions for decision, but the court does not effectively use them as the occasion for building up a more comprehensive theory of provocation and mens rea. Tripodi,"' essentially,
is a very narrow case dealing with the application of the general
requirement of "suddenness" which, obviously, must be at the
heart of a passion-provoked crime. Although it is relatively analogous in its facts to Taylor (reiteration by a wife of adultery already
known to the defendant), Kellock"' and Taschereau JJ.'6 0 now
decided against the accused to help form the majority."' Estey and
Kerwin JJ. are now in the minority.'" Although the case is essentially a decision about the facts, both majority and dissent set
the case in the context of the statute and do refer to the precedents
in its history, especially Taylor. It is perhaps the best example of
Rand J.'s distinctive style-very abstract, rather sparsely reasoned,
little analysis of the cases, but a clear statement of the rule
adopted, and a very pithy argument at the end."' His effort here
is much better than in Shymkowich, as is the dissent of Estey J.
" See R. v. Letenock (1917), 22 Cr. App. Rep. 221 (C.C.A.).
" Taschereau J. concurring.
15 The decision is an intimation of what might happen in the capital
murder area, with the use of drunkenness to negate "planning and deliberation", although Taylor is much better reasoned than Mitchell.
" Rinfret C.J. concurring.
[1955] 4 D.L.R. 445.
" Locke J. concurring.
16o Who agrees with Rand J.'s opinion.
161 Fauteux J. also joined with Rand J.
161 Cartwright and Abbott JJ. now join in the dissent of Estey J.
"1 "It may be that such a code is recognized in Bagaladi as a mitigation
of the law's severest sanction, but it has no place in the law of this country.
Any abatement of the consequences of such an act can here come only
from the executive. I cannot imagine any encroachment on the inviolability
of the individual more dangerous than that such a palliation should be
countenanced by the courts." At p. 447.
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Not too much can be said about Salamon, except that it
definitely shows the intransigence of Cartwright J. The majority
judgment of Fauteux J.'" dismissed the appeal from conviction
first, because there was no error in the charge about drunkenness
and provocation and, second, because the defence of provocation
was unavailable to the accused as the aggressor. Locke J. says the
same thing in a concurring opinion. Cartwright J. after belabouring the charge in order to find a technical error, orders a new trial
without even mentioning the obvious problem of law which was
one of the main bases of the majority. A very good argument
could be made that one ought not to require a wrongful act of
the deceasedm.. to justify use of provocation for mitigation, but
the legislature has enacted that this is required. A defensible
argument might be made that even this legislative demand does
not exclude original or continuing aggression by the accused which
provoked the victim's wrongful act. The defendant can still have
lost control over his emotions and behaviour and perhaps warrants
the mitigation provided by the defence. It should be obvious,
though, that the argument must be made.
The final case, Wright,'6 6 is treated by the court as raising
a very narrow and very obvious point. Fauteux J.' ordered a new
trial after an acquittal on the grounds of the judge's failure to inform the jury of the "objective" character of the first test. He
should tell the jury that the defendant's character, background,
temperament, idiosyncracies, or drunkenness, are all irrelevant
as a matter of law to first test. All of this is very easy and authoritative, established in the precedents, and it is a wonder that the
trial judge missed it. On the other hand, there are grave difficulties
in the logic of a purely objective test which pays no attention to
the subjective characteristics of the accused. Fauteux J. does here
cite a passage from Bedder"8 which shows how the notion of a
standard, excluding a purely blind rage, requires some form of
objective test. However, he leaves the desirability of this English
standard completely unexplained and seems totally unaware of
how severely it has been criticized. Moreover, as can be seen from
its great elaboration in negligence, the "reasonable man" acts in a
context which must share many of the characteristics of the defendant in order that it be meaningful.'6 9 If the subjective knowledge of the accused is relevant,' why not other features, such
Taschereau, Abbott, Martland, and Judson JJ. concurring.
Actual or apparent, as is shown in R. v. Manchuk, supra, foot166 Supra, footnote 16.
note 153.
167 Judson, Ritchie, Hall, and Pigeon JJ. concurring.
16 Supra, footnote 152.
169 One might compare the sophisticated treatment of the analogous
problem in tort law in Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927),
41 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
170 As it was in Manchuk, supra, footnote 153.
164
'6
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as his relationship with the victim (which is apparently excluded
by Wright)? One cannot evaluate, or even talk sensibly about, a
wrongful act or insult without viewing it in a situation. The court
missed a real opportunity to begin the difficult task of drawing lines
between the permissible subjective features of the "ordinary man",
and those which are to be excluded.
Wright is an interesting development for two reasons. First,
the decision is unanimous against the accused, the first in this
area. Second, Cartwright J. does not sit, also a first, and perhaps
the explanation for the former proposition. Each of these precedents was duplicated in Carker,'7 2 the only decision in the period
raising the issue of duress. The defendant lost unanimously in an
opinion of Ritchie J."' which reversed the British Columbia Court
of Appeal's reversal of his conviction. The defendant was charged
with damaging public property, the plumbing fixtures in his cell,
during a prison riot and proposed to prove both that he had been
threatened with a knife in the back if he refused to join in and
also that the background in this prison made the threat credible.
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's ruling that this
evidence was irrelevant because it could not amount to a defence
under section 17 of the Code.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal had disagreed with the
trial judge for three reasons: first, it might fulfill the requirements
of section 17; second, if it did not, the section is not an exhaustive
definition of the common law defence of duress which attempts
to implement the policy of the criminal law that prohibited conduct must be fully free and voluntary; third, the requirement that
the specific offence be committed "wilfully" might be negatived by
this evidence even if it did not satisfy a general defence of duress.
One can suspect that the court's view of the case was heightened
by the fact that the defendant received a one-year jail term from
the trial judge who had rejected the evidence.
The Supreme Court's response to these arguments was very
sparsely reasoned, although each of its conclusions is quite plausible. The third argument about the relevance of the term "wilfully"
was wrong because it was defined by section 371(1) as including
the accused's knowledge that his acts will probably cause damage.
However, the court did not cite its own Dunbar" decision which
"I One might compare the definition for the defence stated by the Model
Penal Code, s. 201.3:
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaugher when: ...
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be."
172 (1967), 2 C.C.C. 190 (S.C.C.).
us Taschereau C.J., Fauteux, and Martland JJ. concurring.
" (1936), 67 C.C.C. 20 (S.C.C.).
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had already held that evidence of duress affected only the motive
which led to prohibited conduct and would not exclude intentional
awareness of the commission of the offence. Hence the court dismissed a chance to clarify the precise character of duress as an
excuse which affects our ability to choose and not our intellectual
awareness of the fact we are choosing to disobey the criminal
law."7
As regards the interpretation of section 17, probably the court
was right in holding there was no threat of immediate harm by a
person who was present when the offence was committed by the
accused. The latter was in a locked cell here and the anonymous
threat, however realistic it was, could only be implemented some
time in the future. The court was able to distinguish the Subramanian case,"' relied on by the Court of Appeal, both on the
facts and by the language of the relevant provisions. Unfortunately,
again the court proceeds on the narrowest and most legalistic
grounds. It does not advert at all to the obvious purposes of the
statutory language which is to deny the excuse where it is possible
to inform the legal authorities in the interim and thus require that
the actor take the risk that their protection will be successful.
Only in the light of such a purposive elaboration of the section
will the decision give successful guidance to lower courts in different fact situations.
The most significant facet of the opinion is Ritchie J.'s bold
assumption that section 17 codifies and exhaustively defines the
common law rules and principles respecting a legal defence of
duress. He does not even advert to the possibility that the court
can and should have a role under section 7 of the Code in developing this defence further in the light of its purposes and those of
the related justification of "necessity". If we view the common law
as a process of rational elaboration of basic legal principles, and
not simply as a static collection of specific legal rules, it would
not appear totally implausible to hold that the process of common
law development under section 7 can still continue even after the
legislature has intervened under section 17 to give a certain degree
of assured protection to an accused."' Especially in the light of the
demonstrated inadequacies of the section 17 formulation in implementing the logic of the basic principle of criminal blameworthiness,"' it is doubly unfortunate that the issue was not con17

Which would have required that it deal with the important later

English case of R. v. Steane, [1947] 1 K.B. 997 (C.C.A.).
"' Subramanian v. Public Prosecutor, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965.

"' The drafting history of the section is quite consistent with this point
of view; see Coolican, Comment (1967), 5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 78.
17 As good an alternative definition as any is the Model Penal Code
effort in s. 2.09:
(1)It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offence because he was coerced to do so by the
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sidered worthy of argument in the Carker opinion."
IV.

Legal Reasoning and the Supreme Court.

I hope it is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the personal
attitudes and reasoning styles of our Supreme Court judges do play
a paramount role in determining the results of the cases they
decide. The behavioural analyses indicated that some of the
judges, at least, were primarily influenced by their attitudes to
the substantive issues before them. Moreover, these same judges,
Cartwright and Fauteux JJ., tended to participate in more of these
cases, to write more of the judgments in them, and to attract more
concurrences in their opinions. Though they were, on occasion,
willing to respect a binding precedent recently decided, the
necessity for this was rare. It is fair to say that, in every area of
our concern-strict liability, degrees of mens rea, mistake of law,
drunkenness, provocation, constructive murder and duress-the
basic decisions were made in this period, by this court, and without it being, or seeing itself to be, bound to decide one way or the
other. It had choices to be made and it made them, largely in
accordance with the attitudes of one of its two influential and
partisan contenders in the area.
I assume, then, that the court here, as indeed anywhere in its
work, is rarely totally confined by an easy-to-recognize, authoritative, legal rule. These rules may shape and control the boundaries
of decision and they may furnish the criteria which indicate how
the court should solve the difficult problems with which it is left.
However, they do not objectively and impersonally and obviously
determine the final legal rule the court produces. We have seen
how significant are the attitudes of both the partisans and the
"swing" men on the court in influencing these conclusions and we
have also seen something of the substantive content of the rules
produced. What I propose now is to gather together all of the
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person
of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
have been unable to resist.
(2) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor
recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he
would be subjected to duress. The defence is also unavailable if he was
negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices
to establish culpability for the offense charged.
(3) It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her
husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense
under this section. [The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence
of her husband, is coerced is abolished.]
(4) When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under
section 3.02, this section does not preclude such defense.
m7Supra, footnote 172. Under facts quite analogous to the convictions
in Dunbar and Carker, the common law principle of duress was used to
excuse the defendant in A.-G. v. Whelan, [1934] Irish Rep. 518 (C.C.A.).
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evidence available in this area of its work so as to portray the
process of legal reasoning which mediates between attitude and
product.
The most evident dimension for analysis is the quality of
the judges as lawyers. A compelling conclusion in this regard is
that the court is little interested in or concerned with general legal
questions. In many cases it totally disregards important general
questions of legal principle in order to concentrate on the manipulation of the facts (or the jury charge) in the particular case.'
Even where it does see the necessity of adverting to the general
problem, it rarely feels the question worth any lengthy detailed
analysis. The most immediate evidence for this last proposition is
the length of judgment which is devoted to the general issue. We
might compare the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Binus
with that of either Cartwright or Judson JJ., the several British
Columbia Court of Appeal judgments in the intoxication area
with those of Fauteux and Ritchie JJ. in George, the Ontario
Court of Appeal opinions in King with those of Taschereau and
Ritchie JJ., or even the dissent of Fauteux J. in More with the
majority judgment of Cartwright J. In each case, the former perceives a real legal problem, worthy of extensive intellectual grappling. The latter judgments perceive and explicitly advert to the
same problem but they assume that the answer is obvious and really
worthy of no more than the statement of a conclusion. The one
judge on the court who is rarely in the latter category is Fauteux J.
As a result, the Supreme Court customarily ignores all, or
almost all, of the relevant precedents in an .area. Perhaps the best
way of realizing that a problem is complex is to be made aware of
the variety of decisions in different jurisdictions-in Canada,
England, Australia, the United States, to name only those with
the same legal tradition as our own-and thus to see that alternative answers are possible because different courts have gone in
different directions. Our court never cites American or Australian
precedents in this area, does not feel bound by lower court Canadian decisions'' nor by English decisions.'" Interestingly enough
the same attitude carries over to its own precedents which it often
fails to cite though theoretically it is bound by them. Perhaps
its attitude to its earlier precedents is a function of its lack of
concern for the legal value of the decisions it is making."'
When the court does rely on a precedent, again it has a
distinctive style in its approach. Customarily it picks a passage
180 E.g., Bradley, supra, footnote 121, Shymkowich,
18' E.g., Morelli in Beaver, supra, footnote 34.

supra, footnote 21.

E.g., the provocation cases.
Its view of precedent in the Mann, supra, footnote 53, Binus, supra,
footnote 11 and Peda, supra, footnote 114, sequence is perhaps the epitome
of this attitude.
1e2

18
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out of the opinion, without regard to its context, and uses this
as the statement of a general legal rule to be applied in the instant
case. Perhaps the classic instance of this is the adoption of the
passage from Beard in George, but the same is true in Beaver,
Watts and Gaunt, and so on. The court is rarely aware of the
ambiguity of such general language-of how it takes on colour
and greater clarity from the factual situation and the rest of the
opinion. A classic instance of this is the use of Cartwright J.'s
language in More by Spence J. in Mitchell, to extend the reach
of the former rule far beyond what Cartwright J. says, in Mitchell,
that he intended. Yet Cartwright J. himself is one of the great
offenders in this regard, perhaps most flagrantly in his use of the
passage from Loiselle in the very different Mann context. One of
the few good analyses, and then distinguishing of, precedent occurs
in the provocation cases where the common law precedents are not
considered decisive in interpreting our statute.
The court's attitude towards the authority of these legal
sources, especially textual, is much the same. The court never uses
Canadian periodical writings,"' only twice refers to American
texts" and really uses only two English texts, Williams on Criminal
Law'" and Turner's edition of Kenny.' These it uses as it does
precedents, as the source of an authoritative passage stating a
rule, not as a reference for the authority of a rule which it states
itself. It never cites these texts to show that alternatives are
available in the common law, or as the source of arguments
favouring one alternative as more desirable and compatible with
principle than another.
Finally, the court is very deficient in making analytical distinctions and then clarifying the meaning of the rules which it proposes to adopt and use. The very important question of mens rea
and unreasonable mistake of fact has been left totally confused by
the efforts of Cartwright J.,"' Estey J.'" and Ritchie J."' I am not
here criticizing the fact of disagreement since, obviously, there is
room for it on such a basic issue. However, none of the judges
seems to realize that there is a distinction here, that there are
115 Fauteux J. refers to Weihofen, op. cit., footnote 134, in More,
supra, footnote 19, and Ritchie J. to Holmes in King, supra, footnote 12.
L.Q. 27, 407. It was not mentioned in any of the Supreme Court cases in
the driving area and I find it impossible to believe that consideration of
this work would not have enhanced the quality of reasoning in these decisions.
185 Fauteux
J. refers to Weihofen, op. cit., footnote 134, in More,
supra, footnote 19, and Ritchie J. to Holmes in King, supra, footnote 12.
.86 Op. cit., footnote 27.
m Op. cit., footnote 78.
"18In Rees, supra, footnote 18 and Beaver, supra, footnote 31.
189 In Watts and Gaunt, supra, footnote 30 and Shymkowich,
supra,
footnote 21.
..In King, supra, footnote 12.
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others who disagree, and that it is necessary to make an argument
in favour of the position that he adopts. Similarly, the court does
not ever explicitly deal with the distinction between voluntary
act and intentionm.. or the distinction between intention as to consequences and mistake as to circumstances.." though these have
long been current in the literature, including writers such as
Williams and Turner whom the court often does cite.
All in all, the court, at least in this area of the law, does not
appear to fare too well in an assessment of its "legal" ability,
except for Fauteux J. It might be argued that this is not too important since the inevitable "openness" of the issues which reach
it demands more the quality of statemanship, awareness of
practical consequences, and intelligence of attitude for their adequate resolution. Hence the second dimension for our evaluation of
the court, both from its opinions and from its results, concerns its
performance as a developer of criminal law policy.
It is apparent from its opinions that the court does not see itself as a purely passive instrument of positive law. Quite often it
adverts to the specific consequences or the relevant practical
factors in its decisions. This is most often true of Fauteux J."e'
and occasionally of Cartwright J. 1' or Rand J.' However, even
Fauteux J.'s efforts seem, upon reflection, to be lacking in persuasiveness, however much an improvement they are on his
fellow judges.
There are several reasons for this. First, the court never seems
to realize, consciously, that it has an independent law-making
role to play in this whole area. It is obvious that the court is
making policy in this area, and that judicial attitudes are significantly affecting the policies that result. However, the court never
expresses awareness of these facts. Only rarely does it speak of
section 7(2) and the preservation of the common law, or the
failure of the legislature (especially outside the Code) to speak
to the issues of mens rea. It does not draw the inference that these
gaps necessarily require that it play a collaborative role in developing our criminal law."'
Because the court sees no general role for itself in this area, the
obvious corollary is that it has articulated no general philosophy
about what the doctrines of mens rea shall be like. There are only
faint hints of the reasons for the doctrinal protection of mens rea
(usually in quotations from English judges) and only slightly
191 Though it was raised directly by King, supra, footnote 12 and Bleta,
supra, footnote 40.
192 Which was so important to the drunkenness issue.
"I See his opinions in Rees, supra, footnote 18, Beaver, supra, footnote
31, More, supra, footnote 19 and the provocation cases.
* As in Rees and Beaver, ibid.
* In Tripodi, supra, footnote 158.
19 Carker, supra, footnote 172, amply demonstrates this.
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more explicit are the competing reasons for excluding it in specific
cases, wholly or in part. There is some verbal attachment to the
notion of legislative purpose (especially by Fauteux J.) but rarely
does even Fauteux J. come to grips with what the legislative purpose likely is,"' or why it might require limitation of mens rea."'
Never once, in any one of these twenty-four cases, do the judges try
to look at the sense or purpose of the precedent which they cite.
The court often blindly follows passages extracted from opinions or
texts and just as often totally ignores relevant precedents of the
same authority as the former. What they do not do, though, is
to search in a precedent (or a series of them) for a rule with practical significance for a type-situation, one which they choose to
follow for this reason.
In my opinion, perhaps the greatest deficiency in the court's
activity as a policy maker, is its failure to see the area as an integrated whole. The court does not perceive that the various doctrinal
areas I have discussed compose a family of related problems,
with several strands or themes of principle running throughout.
As a result, the court never once cites a case in one doctrinal area
as a relevant aid in resolving problems which arise in another conceptually distinct area.
What are the consequences of this? A court does not have the
facilities to make law in the comprehensive "all-at-once" framework available to a legislature. Instead it proceeds piece by piece,
step by step, as different cases come before it. Yet the incidence of
litigation can never bring many cases within a very specific
area before the court over even an extended period of time. As
a result, judicial law-making in an adversary prdcess is apt to be
disjointed, unreasoned, and incoherent, as a court deals only with
a very specific question whose immediate boundaries limit what
the court sees as significant in the problems.
Yet there is a remedy for these deficiencies which enables a
court to take advantage of its peculiar position as an adjudicator
of specific practical disputes in order to build, in an incremental
fashion, a coherent rational body of law. This remedy is the
technique of seeing in each specific case an instance of a general
principle, a practical test of a more or less philosophical theory
of the competing values which the whole area of law ought to
protect. Within such a framework the reasons which are given for
deciding whether a particular crime requires mens rea are vitally
important for deciding which of the various alternative forms of
mens rea should be preferred (and vice versa). Arguments from
each of these areas are of prime significance in determining what
As I suggested in discussing More, supra, footnote 19.
"' As he advocated in Rees, supra, footnote 18 and Beaver, supra,
footnote 31; compare R. v. Lim Chin Aik, supra, footnote 70.
197

1971]

The Supreme Court of Canada

355

the court should do about such distinctive questions as duress,
provocation, automatism, and intoxication. Each instance of the
latter enables the court to see a new facet of the whole problem,
to re-examine as much as is necessary the developing philosophy
of mens rea as a whole, and to test the desirability of the apparent
direction of this philosophy by its application to a concrete issue.
Such a theory of judicial policy-making requires the court to
see that judges have an independent role to play, one for which
their institutional characteristics fit them better than any other
body. Such a role requires that they think about the real, practical consequences of what they are doing and ask whether this is
really what they ought to be doing. Because this process is explicit,
it is conducive to the development of a shared principle, in whose
articulation many members of the court collaborate over a period
of time-indeed many courts over this period of time-a principle
which is founded on reasons which are open to criticism and
change and which is tested and evaluated in all of the concrete
situations to which it is relevant.
Of course, this is an ideal which I have stated for the judicial
process, and every court must fall short of it to some extent in its
performance. Unfortunately, it is apparent that our Supreme Court
does not perceive at all that this is the ideal to which it should
strive and thus, of necessity, it must fall far short of even what it is
capable of doing. By and large, the court does not see major legal
questions involved in the cases before it and does not see that
the general issues it deals with are complex and difficult. The
court proceeds as if the decisions were already made for it, by
the legislature or by courts, though perhaps the answers are stated
in texts. This is indeed paradoxical since the decisions have not
been made, and the attitudes of the judges determine the results
they themselves produce. But it is a fact that the court believes it
does not choose, and that it acts on this belief, and that this also
determines, in as important a way as the substantive attitudes
themselves, the products of Supreme Court decision-making.
When we look at the court as a policy-making or law-developing body, we cannot really hold the significance of this effort to
be exhausted in the votes of the judges in the cases before them.
Very few criminal law cases come to court, few of those which go
to court are contested, even fewer of these are appealed, and only
an infinitesimal minority reach the Supreme Court. If the court
is to play an important role as a national law-maker, it cannot
rely on the specific decisions it makes in its own cases as any index
of its effectiveness. Rather, it must formulate general standards
which all of the other decision-makers in the process, especially
the lower court judges, are able and willing to follow themselves.
It is on this dimension that the court has failed most dismally.
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As we have seen, the court has often limited its focus to the
specific facts of individual cases, rather than the general legal
question these cases raise. It does not try clearly to formulate
a precise legal rule, to have the majority of the judges in a case
join in an opinion which accepts this rule as the minimum basis for
the decision,19 9 to set this rule in the context of developing precedents in this field, and then to re-use and build upon it in subsequent cases. The court has not tried to formulate general directive principles and establish them in Canadian law, with explicit
reference to their justifying reasons.
As a result, the most paradoxical conclusion of this whole
study is that the Supreme Court has had very little influence on the
course of Canadian law in this area. This is extremely strange if
our assumptions are correct (1) that the court in this period has
spoken to almost every major question of mens rea not just once,
but several times; (2) that the previous law left much of these
issues quite open to judicial innovation; (3) that the court itself
chose to innovate in accordance with preponderant judicial attitudes, and (4) that there is no evidence of lower court unwillingness to accept the results of the Supreme Court's value attitudes.
It is hard to believe that the results of this twenty years of effort,
and twenty-five or so major decisions, has had little or no independent impact on our Canadian law. Yet the conclusion appears inescapable.
The decisions on fault versus strict liability are sometimes
mentioned, sometimes not: followed in one direction by one
court, in another direction by another court. Sherrasv. De Rutzeno'
is much more important than Rees, Beaver, or King. The decisions
on mistake of law are not only not influential, they are rarely
mentioned. The real decision on the presumption of intent is that
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gianotti.2" Drunkenness is still
governed by Beard (though somewhat muddied by George), while
Bleta is a non-decision as regards automatism. The court did not
really say anything more than the statute in the constructive
murder area (except in Rowe), and what it did say as to the
problem of degrees of mens rea in driving offences has been impossible for anyone to follow. There are exceptions to all of this,
here as elsewhere, in the provocation area where the court does
seem to have adopted a policy, formulated a rule to implement it,
given the reasons for the rule, followed the rule themselves, and
seen it influence lower court decisions substantially. This last
exception, though, proves by contrast the general comments I
' This failing is most graphically demonstrated in the Mann-BinusPeda sequence which has caused Laskin J.A., perhaps the most perceptive
Canadian judge, to fail twice in trying to follow the court's tortuous path.
200
2O1

Supra, footnote 49.
Supra, footnote 123.
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would make about the court's efforts in the whole area of mens rea.
Conclusion
As I have cautioned several times in the course of this article, we
must be careful about attributing too much significance to the
patterns of behaviour which appear in this small sample of the
court's work. If this is true, then, we must be doubly cautious
about the validity of any speculation which seeks to explain these
patterns. In the face of these warnings, though, I would suggest
certain tentative hypotheses whose adequacy will be tested in
future treatment in the same way as other samples of the court's
decision-making.
In an earlier article2 02 I have suggested that judicial decision-'
making at the appellate court level can be understood on a dimension which ranges from "adjudication" through to "policy-making".
By this I mean that courts can conceive of their role as primarily
oriented either to the adjudication of individual disputes or to
the setting of general policies for the society. The Supreme Court
appears to me to be at the extreme end of the adjudication side
of this spectrum. It obviously does not concern itself explicitly
with policy considerations which might influence creative innovations that it could make in our law. However, it does not even
feel it important to state clearly the legal rules and principles
which it feels are part of our law and which it applies to the
immediate case. Instead, the thrust of its activity appears to
consist in the settlement of concrete disputes as they come before
it, with little or no regard to the general type problem each
appears to present.
If this orientation in our Supreme Court does in fact obtain, it
raises several serious questions, both as to why it has so developed
and also as to the constitutional significance it has. As regards the
first, we can speculate about the jurisdiction of the court, especially
the appeal as of right above a certain monetary amount. As
regards the second, we might wonder about the value of a second
appeal for purposes of doing justice in a concrete dispute. Do
we need a national Supreme Court if it does not conceive of its
primary functions as the clarification and elaboration of our legal
systems in the light of basic principles and community values?
Should a court with the orientation that ours appears to have, be
given the task of administering an entrenched Bill of Rights
which controls either federal or provincial legislative power? These
are vitally important questions but I would not pretend to deal
with them until a later time and with further documentation.
202

Op. cit., footnote 3.
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EPILOGUE
The research for and writing of this article was basically completed in the early fall of 1969. The period under review, then,
was from 1949 to the middle of 1969. Since then two further
interesting cases have appeared in the reports dealing with the
general problem of mens rea and the criminal defences. Rather
than incorporate them into the body of the article and rework
the latter, I thought it would be interesting to treat them as
subsequent data with which some of the emerging hypotheses might
be tested.
The details of one of these cases, R. v. Peda" have been
recounted earlier, as the last in the sequence dealing with the
degrees of blameworthiness in driving offences. The second case,
R. v. Borg,2 " deals with the problem of the defence of insanity,
the only such case to reach the court in this whole period. Moreover, it is concerned with the most critical problem in this whole
defence, to wit, the extent to which the legal definitions of insanity incorporated in section 16 of the Code could be stretched
to embrace our deepening psychological understanding. At the
time the McNaghten rules were first established, it appeared appropriate to conceive of mental disability in purely intellectual
terms, but over a hundred years of debate have amply demonstrated this no longer to be true. The McRuer Royal Commission
suggested that certain subtle variations in the language of our
Code, especially the use of the word "appreciate", gave legal
warrant to a wider view of mental disability, embracing such
categories as neuroses or psychopaths."' Borg was the first case to
ask the Supreme Court if this, indeed, were true.
If we look at this problem in terms of basic principle, then
a strong presumption should operate in favour of extension of the
insanity defence. The whole point of mens rea as a requirement of
criminal guilt is that the defendant has chosen to commit an
offence or, at least, that he has been able to choose not to do so.
Although such an ability to choose can be affected indirectly
by lack of knowledge, it also can directly be rendered inoperative.
We recognize this fact in a more or less limited fashion in the
defences of duress, necessity, or provocation. If modern psychology tells us that psychic disability can function primarily with
respect to our control over our decisions and actions, then the
reasons behind the insanity defence demand its extension. Yet this
203
20
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Supra, footnote 114.
(1969), 4 C.C.C. 262.
Report of Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity as a Defence

in Criminal Cases (Ottawa, 1956), pp. 11-12. Probably the same interpretation is defensible even under the old M'Naghten Rules. See People V.
Wolfl (1964), 394 P.2d 959; Goldstein, The Insanity Defence (1967).
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is peculiarly an area where the practical considerations inherent in
the administration of a criminal justice system may require limitation on the logic of blameworthiness. We may be very doubtful
about the claims of modern psychiatry to isolate a mental defect
which leaves our reasoning powers unimpaired. Some psychiatrists
have seemed to suggest that the very fact of criminal behaviour is
a sufficient reason for inferring the existence of some sociopathic
disability. The qualms these claims create may become particularly
important at the level of a jury trial where we ask the layman
to distinguish between an impulse which was not resisted and an
impulse which could not be resisted. The interpretation of section
16 in Borg logically involved some reference to these competing
considerations which have been so much discussed in recent
literature and case law.
Borg had killed a R.C.M.P. policeman as well as two women.
He had purchased a rifle and called the R.C.M.P. to come to
his home before opening fire. His only defence was insanity.
Although the Alberta Court of Appeal was divided in reversing
a conviction for capital murder, it was unanimous in accepting
the legitimacy of a possible insanity verdict from the jury. The
only question which either of their opinions dealt with was the
adequacy of the judge's charge in raising the issue of legal insanity for the jury and explaining the possible ways in which the
evidence might support the defence. The majority. opinion of
the Supreme Court, written by Caitwright J., held that the adequacy of the judge's charge was irrelevant because insanity could
not be a defence here.
Amazingly enough, the opinion does not indicate clearly
whether this is because the mental disability was insufficient in
law or because there was inadequate proof that the disability in
fact was operative at the time of the killing. Either interpretation of the opinion appears defensible to this reader206 and it is
206 The essential passages in the Cartwright J.'s opinion (concurred in
by Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Pigeon JJ.) are the
following. He quoted the critical passage in the jury charge:
"Now I must tell you that at law a so-called irresistible or uncontrollable impulse of itself is not a defence within the meaning of this Act unless that uncontrollable or irresistible movement or impulse stems from the
existence of insanity as defined here, and when one looks to the reasonable
rationality of it, it becomes so obvious why it is that a mere irresistible
and uncontrollable impulse is not a defence. Because everybody would get
such impulses with respect to any offence. The man who breaks a jeweller's
window to steal a diamond, has an irresistible impulse to do it, and, therefore, is acquitted on the ground of insanity if one is guided by this mere
proposition of irresistible impulse. It must be, as this section says, and I
repeat it to you:
'For the purpose of this section a person is insane when he is in a state
of natural imbecility',
now, there is no suggestion of that here-
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indeed astonishing that the court did not appreciate the importance
of clarifying the basis of its conclusion. No legal authorities were
cited at all with reference to the insanity issue.
Nor could it be said that the court simply did not advert
to the wider significance of this case. In a meticulous dissenting
opinion, Hall J. who was joined by Spence J., not only went over
the evidence and jury direction in some detail, but also spoke
explicitly to the question noted earlier. Unlike the majority opinion, he did cite some legal authorities, referring especially to the
Brown case,"o' which allowed a limited use to medical testimony
about irresistible impulse as evidence of a "disease of the mind".
More important, although he did not mention the McRuer Royal
'or has disease of the mind to an extent that renders him incapable of
appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission or of knowing
that an act or omission is wrong.' . . ."
(At pp. 277-278 of the Supreme Court decision.)
He then recited the most favourable view of the psychiatric evidence
from the point of view of the accused:
"(i) that Borg was suffering from a disease of the mind called a psychopathic state and that he fitted into the classification of the aggressive,
anti-social, impulse-ridden type of personality; (ii) that he had very few
healthy coping mechanisms or ways of defending himself against impulses such a homicidal or sexual ones; (iii) that this lack of impulse
control is chronic; (iv) that a major characteristic of this impulse type
of personality is being emotionally unbalanced by the illness, that the
moral issues cannot be differentiated, that he does not have the moral
ethical part of his mind functioning most of his life but 'most important of all he can have normal cognitive functioning', (v) that the
impulse is so powerful his judgment is impaired but he can still have
intellectual functioning, (vi) that the effect of alcohol is unpredictable;
it can wipe away any controls or it might even calm him; it is impossible to say, (vii) that Borg hates authoritarian figures and under the
influence of his anti-social impulse driven, aggressive impulses, he can
kill, (viii) that if the force of the impulse cannot be resisted 'at that
moment', and this is a symptom of what he suffers from-an impulse
-psychotic state-an irresistible impulse when he neither reasons nor
deliberates, (ix) that the irrestible impulse is both a symptom of the
disease of the mind and the disease itself, (x) that he operates sometimes with normal intellect, sometimes with a little better than normal
intellect, and sometimes like a little boy."
(At pp. 269-270.)
The substance of his disposition of the case is expressed in the following
passage:
"It appears to me that the effect of Dr. Spaner's evidence is that, in his
opinion, at the time of the shooting Borg may have been acting under an
irresistible impulse such as the doctor had described. There is no evidence
that Borg himself had that view and the portions of his statements and of
the answers read to the jury far from suggesting anything in the nature of
an impulsive action indicate a careful and deliberate plan which it took him
some hours to carry out. The actions and statements of Borg after the
shooting indicate that he was well aware of what he had done and that
it was wrong. The evidence taken as a whole falls far short of being
sufficient to satisfy the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities which
rests on the defence when insanity is alleged."
(At p. 270.)
"0'A.-G. South Australia v. Brown, [1960] A.C. 432.
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Commission, he did use the argument about the difference between
section 16 of the Code and the McNaghten rules which inheres
in the word "appreciate". The jury might have found that the impulse affected the defendant's moral sense and that this precluded
an appreciation of the nature and quality of the act. His opinion
would offer substantial scope to the insanity defence, something
which only a fictional view of McNaghten can ever do. The
majority does not respond to this challenge.
The case does raise a nice jurisprudential point. As noted
earlier the 1956 Royal Commission recommended that there be no
changes in section 16 because of a belief that our insanity defence
could be given an expansive reading which would include legitimate cases of true inability to control one's behaviour. A dissenting minority of the Commission had reservations about the
legal defensibility of this confident interpretation of McRuer J. The
minority explicitly said that if the Supreme Court of Canada
gave a contrary and narrow interpretation to section 16, it should
be amended.2 0 8 Should a court use as a reason for its conclusion
this advice by a Royal Commission to the legislature which the
latter appears to have relied upon? Whatever be the answer to this
question, it is indeed unfortunate that the court has left us quite
in the dark about whether section 16 does require amendment
to keep it abreast of developing psychological knowledge.
With this review of the Borg decision, what do these two
cases confirm or refute in our earlier hypotheses? The most intriguing fact is the presence of Cartwright J. as the author of a
decision in Borg in favour of the Crown and against the defendant
in this area, and this is a hotly contested case where the lower
court was reversed. In fact, this may well be the best evidence
there is that the narrower factual theory for the Borg majority
opinion is correct. If judicial behaviouralism ever became a legitimate technique in interpreting precedents, this might be a good
place to use it. Other than this anomaly, all other votes were
predictable with Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting in Borg, and Cartwright, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting together in Peda. The blocs
hold together and it is noteworthy that the mens rea position is
continuing to lose ground.
When we turn away from substantive attitudes and look at
the process of legal reasoning, divergences also appear. In Borg,
the majority opinion cites no authorities and simply ducks the
important questions. The dissent cites two cases and the statute,
but only to reach conclusions, with no discussion of either their
desirability or how they might be applied with any real significance. In Peda, on the other hand, the opinions do deal in some
208
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detail with the relevant authorities in the court's own precedents,
O'Grady, Mann and Binus. Each opinion-writer spells out the
reasons why he feels legally justified in reaching a certain result.
However, as I stated earlier, the majority judgment of Judson J.,
which finds the question still open about the state of mind necessary for "dangerous driving", still leaves us totally uninstructed
in the reasons why his interpretation of the legislature's wishes is
most sensible.
Our general conclusions about the court's attitude towards its
role are similarly confirmed. Not one of the five different opinions
in these cases evinces even the slightest hint that the court realizes
it is making law for Canadian society. There is not even a phrase
which indicates a reason why the court might prefer one rule to
another as a better means of implementing preferred values. To
the extent that any opinion adverts to the question of which legal
rule is to be authoritative, the whole process of argument is directed to finding a rule in the authorities, statutory or decisional. It
is especially ironic, then, that the only clearly established rule,
that established by Binus, was the only authority treated as open
to review.
This lack of concern for policy is understandable though not
justifiable in our positivist legal tradition. What is distinctive about
the Supreme Court as an appellate body is its relative lack of
concern for law-for either the formulation or clarification of the
legal rules which it uses to decide cases. This is manifest in both
majority opinions. We do not know whether Borg is decided on
a narrow factual ground or as the result of a legal rule which
defines the insanity defence in a new area. As the result of terribly
unrealistic view of precedent, the court in Peda deprives us of a
relatively established rule, and then fails to furnish a majority
for any substitute when Ritchie J. joins in two contradictory
opinions.
As usual, the court is much more concerned with deciding
the concrete, individual case, perhaps in the way it thinks best
in the concrete situation. Only a very few such cases can get to
this highest appellate court, though, and the court can only influence the course of decisions in the lower courts, if it states a
rule which they are able to follow. No such rule has been supplied
for each of these very important situations and thus each will have
to return to the court at some time in the future. It is doubly unfortunate that the court's failure to think seriously about its role in
each of these problem areas will deprive the subsequent court of
any real consideration on which it might build. We have had
three attempts at elaboration of the "dangerous driving" provision
and the court has not even begun to consider the real issues it
will raise. In this, as in almost every other respect, Peda and Borg

1971]1

The Supreme Court of Canada

363

confirm our findings about the work of the previous twenty
years."'

2o9 Some time after I completed this article, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided the case of R. V. Trinneer, [1970] S.C.R. 638 which in
effect over-ruled the cases of Cathro and Chow Bew, supra, footnotes 128129. This case also came from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, and
the latter court followed the two earlier Supreme Court decisions (which had
incidentally over-ruled the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cathro),
in holding that reasonable foresight of death occurring in a joint robbery
was necessary for the conviction of the one who did not himself inflict the
bodily injury causing death. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
written by Cartwright C.J., reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal
and restored a conviction on the grounds that reasonable foresight of an
injury was sufficient. This extension of the felony murder rule and consequent restriction on the principle of mens rea was not linguistically required by the relevant sections, or so I believe, and was accomplished with
little reference to the decided authorities or the implications for the
criminal law process of the step the court was taking. The retreat from
the mens rea principle is proceeding apace. Even more recently, the decision in R. v. Pierce Fisheries, accentuated this trend by upholding a conviction under the federal Fisheries Act on the basis of strict liability. See
supra, footnote 49.
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